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Karnataka State Open University
ಮಾನಸಗಂಗೋತ್ರಿ, ಮೈಸೂರು-೫೭೦ ೦೦೬
Manasagangotri, Mysore -570 006

M.A. (Previous)

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

COURSE III

BLOCK-16

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ಉನ್ನತ ಶಿಕ್ಷಣಕ್ಕಾಗಿ ಇರುವ ಅವಕಾಶಗಳನ್ನು ಹೆಚ್ಚಿಸುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಮತ್ತು ಶಿಕ್ಷಣವನ್ನು ಪ್ರಜಾತಂತ್ರೀಕರಿಸುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಮುಕ್ತ ವಿಶ್ವವಿದ್ಯಾನಿಲಯ ವ್ಯವಸ್ಥೆಯನ್ನು ಆರಂಭಿಸಲಾಗಿದೆ.

ರಾಷ್ಟ್ರೀಯ ಶಿಕ್ಷಣ ನೀತಿ 1986

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ಮುಕ್ತ ವಿಶ್ವವಿದ್ಯಾನಿಲಯವು ದೂರಶಿಕ್ಷಣ ಪದ್ಧತಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಬಹುಮಾಧ್ಯಮಗಳನ್ನು ಉಪಯೋಗಿಸುತ್ತದೆ.
.....ವಿದ್ಯಾಕಾಂಕ್ಷಿಗಳನ್ನು ಜ್ಞಾನ ಸಂಪಾದನೆಗಾಗಿ ಕಲಿಕಾ ಕೇಂದ್ರಕ್ಕೆ ಕೊಂಡೊಯ್ಯುವ ಬದಲು, ಜ್ಞಾನ ಸಂಪತ್ತನ್ನು ವಿದ್ಯೆ ಕಲಿಯುವವರ ಬಳಿ ಕೊಂಡೊಯ್ಯುವ ವಾಹಕವಾಗಿದೆ.

ಡಾ. ಕುಳಂದೈಸ್ವಾಮಿ

"The Open University system makes use of Multimedia in distance education system.
..... it is vehicle which transports knowledge to the place of learners rather than transport to the place of learning.

Dr. Kulandai Swamy

ಜ್ಞಾನಪೀಠ ಪ್ರಶಸ್ತಿ ಪುರಸ್ಕೃತ
ರಾಷ್ಟ್ರಕವಿ ಕುವೆಂಪು ಜನ್ಮ ಶತಮಾನೋತ್ಸವ ವರ್ಷ ೨೦೦೪

ವಿಶ್ವಮಾನವ ಸಂದೇಶ

ಪ್ರತಿಯೊಂದು ಮಗುವು ಹುಟ್ಟುತ್ತಲೇ - ವಿಶ್ವಮಾನವ. ಬೆಳೆಯುತ್ತಾ ನಾವು ಅದನ್ನು 'ಅಲ್ಪ ಮಾನವ'ನನ್ನಾಗಿ ಮಾಡುತ್ತೇವೆ. ಮತ್ತೆ ಅದನ್ನು 'ವಿಶ್ವಮಾನವ'ನನ್ನಾಗಿ ಮಾಡುವುದೇ ವಿದ್ಯೆಯ ಕರ್ತವ್ಯವಾಗಬೇಕು.

ಮನುಜ ಮತ, ವಿಶ್ವ ಪಥ, ಸರ್ವೋದಯ, ಸಮನ್ವಯ, ಪೂರ್ಣದೃಷ್ಟಿ ಈ ಪಂಚಮಂತ್ರ ಇನ್ನು ಮುಂದಿನ ದೃಷ್ಟಿಯಾಗಬೇಕಾಗಿದೆ. ಅಂದರೆ, ನಮಗೆ ಇನ್ನು ಬೇಕಾದುದು ಆ ಮತ ಈ ಮತ ಅಲ್ಲ; ಮನುಜ ಮತ. ಆ ಪಥ ಈ ಪಥ ಅಲ್ಲ; ವಿಶ್ವ ಪಥ. ಆ ಒಬ್ಬರ ಉದಯ ಮಾತ್ರವಲ್ಲ; ಸರ್ವರ ಸರ್ವಸ್ತರದ ಉದಯ. ಪರಸ್ಪರ ವಿಮುಖವಾಗಿ ಸಿಡಿದು ಹೋಗುವುದಲ್ಲ; ಸಮನ್ವಯಗೊಳ್ಳುವುದು. ಸಂಕುಚಿತ ಮತದ ಅಂಶಿಕ ದೃಷ್ಟಿ ಅಲ್ಲ; ಭೌತಿಕ ಪಾರಮಾರ್ಥಿಕ ಎಂಬ ಭಿನ್ನದೃಷ್ಟಿ ಅಲ್ಲ; ಎಲ್ಲವನ್ನು ಭಗವದ್ ದೃಷ್ಟಿಯಿಂದ ಕಾಣುವ ಪೂರ್ಣದೃಷ್ಟಿ.

ಕುವೆಂಪು

Gnanapeeta Awardee
Kuvempu's Birth Centenary Year - 2004

Gospel of Universal Man

Every Child, at birth, is the universal man. But, as it grows, we turn it into "a petty man". It should be the function of education to turn it again into the enlightened "universal man".

The Religion of Humanity, the Universal Path, the Welfare of All, Reconciliation, the Integral Vision- these *five mantras* should become View of the Future. In other words, what we want henceforth is not this religion or that religion, but the Religion of Humanity ; not this path or that path, but the Universal Path ; not the well-being of this individual or that individual, but the Welfare of All ; not turning away and breaking off from one another, but reconciling and uniting in concord and harmony ; and, above all, not the partial view of a narrow creed, not the dual outlook of the material and the spiritual, but the Integral Vision of seeing all things with the eye of the Divine.

Kuvempu

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ಮಾನಸಗಂಗೋತ್ರಿ, ಮೈಸೂರು-೫೭೦ ೦೦೬

तर्कसंग्रह-२

Block 16

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Karnataka State Open University, 2004

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प्रस्तावना

प्रिय विद्यार्थिनः

अस्माकं कर्णाटक-राज्य-मुक्तविश्वविद्यानिलये स्नातकोत्तरशिक्षणकक्षां प्रवेष्टृभ्यः भवद्भ्यः हार्दं स्वागतम्।

विश्वस्य प्राचीनभाषासु संस्कृतभाषा प्रमुखतमा। वेदेषु दृश्यमाना इयं भाषा क्रि.पू. पञ्चमशतके काव्यस्य रूपं प्रापदिति वदन्ति। गच्छता कालेन संस्कृतभाषा उच्छशिक्षण-शासन-लेखन-काव्यादिषु अव्याहता समुपयुक्तम्। प्रायो लोके 2500 वर्षाधिकम् इतिहासं प्राप्तवती अन्या भाषा नास्ति।

वेदाः, शास्त्राणि, इतिहासाः, पुराणानि, काव्यानि, दर्शनानि, व्याख्यानानि, प्रशस्तयः, शासनानि, चाटुपद्यानि, सुभाषितानि इत्येवं नानाप्रकारेषु निबद्धाः कृतयः संस्कृतवाङ्मये विलसन्ति। अस्य परिचयः पाठ्यक्रमानुसारेण कारयिष्यते। विशेषाध्ययनाय गहन-शोधनाय च युष्माकं सिद्धतायाः सम्पादनमेव स्नातकोत्तरशिक्षणस्य मुख्यः उद्देशः।

भवतां स्वाध्यायसुलभाय स्वयंबोधन पद्धत्या (SIM) एते पाठाः विशिष्टरूपेण आरचिताः। बहवः विद्वांसः एतान् पाठान् सज्जीकर्तुं कृतभूरिपरिश्रमाः सन्ति। तेषां साहाय्यं सकार्तज्ञं स्मरामि।

भवन्तः सर्वे सम्यगधीत्य अस्यां भाषायां साहित्ये च विशेषज्ञानं सम्पादयन्तु इति आशासे। 'श्रद्धावान् लभते ज्ञानम्' इति भगवद्गीतोक्तरीत्या भवता श्रद्धायुक्ताध्ययनं फलप्रदं यशप्रदं च भूयादिति ममाशयः। शुभं भूयात्।

जीयात् गीर्वाणभारती।

डा. एन्. राधाकृष्ण भट्
संस्कृतविभागाध्यक्षः
कर्णाटकराज्य-मुक्तविश्वविद्यानिलयः
मानसगङ्गोत्री, मैसूरु।

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1.0 Block Objectives

In this block you will be able to understand the fourfold divisions of Pramā and Pramāṇa - Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda.

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UNIT-5
FOURFOLD DIVISION OF PRAMĀ AND PRAMĀṆA PRATYAKṢA PRAMĀṆA

STRUCTURE

5.0 Introduction
5.1 Objectives
5.2 TS - Fourfold division of Pramā and Pramāṇa
5.3 TS - The Definition of 'karaṇa' or instrument
5.4 TS - On the notion of cause
TSD - The Concept of anyathāsiddhi or dispensable element
5.5 TS - The definition of 'kārya' or effect
5.6 TS - Three kinds of cause defined and analysed
TSD - Two kinds of non-inherent cause
5.7 TS - The definition of 'karaṇa' clarified.
5.8 TS - Definition of perceptual cognition (pratyakṣajñāna) and its two-fold division.
TS - Indeterminate and Determinate cognition (nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka)
TSD - Proof for the existence of nirvikalpaka
5.9 TS - Sannikarṣa (contact) and its six varieties
TSD - The problem of transmission of sound
5.10 TSD - Examination of anupalabdhi as a distinct pramāṇa
5.11 Let us sum up
5.12 Self assessment questions
5.13 Key Words

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UNIT-5
FOURFOLD DIVISION OF PRAMĀ AND PRAMĀṆA PRATYAKṢA PRAMAṆA

5.0 INTRODUCTION

In the previous unit, we have explained that knowledge is the basis of all activities of life. The Nyāya-Vaiśesika school holds that knowledge is a specific quality of the self and it arises when there is the contact of sense-organ with its respective object. The function of knowledge is to reveal objects to the self. There are two views as regards the manner in which knowledge of objects arise, i.e., either they are known directly or indirectly through psychic media. In both the cases the internal sense-organ, viz., mind [illegible] to the self. In the second case, mind acts [illegible] the self and the object which are distinct. In this [illegible] we have referred to two kinds of knowledge as valid (pramā) and erroneous (bhrama). [illegible] knowledge is right knowledge. Its proximate [illegible] called pramāṇa ; the content to which it refers is known as prameya. The word pramāṇa is derived from the root 'mā' to measure, which siginifies the means of measurement. That is, it ascertains the correctness of knowledge. As regards the nature and scope of pramāṇas, there is much divergence of opinion among Indian thinkers. The Cārvāka materialists recognize only one pramāṇa, viz., perception ; the Bauddhas and the Vaiśeṣikas recognize two pramāṇas, viz., perception and inference; the Sāṅkhyas admit three, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony; the Naiyāyikas recognize four, viz., perception,

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inference, analogy and verbal testimony; the Prābhākara school of Mimāṃsakas recognize five, viz., the above four pramāṇas and presumption (arthāpatti); the Bhāṭṭa school of Mimāṃsakas and Advaitins recognize these five pramāṇas and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as the sixth pramāṇa. The Paurāṇikas, in addition to these six pramāṇas recognize necessary inclusion (sambhava) and traditional hear say (aitihya) as the seventh and the eighth pramāṇa. However, the leading exponents of Indian philosophy are unanimous in discarding the last two, viz., sambhava and aitihya, as the former could be brough under inference and the latter under verbal testimony. The main thrust of this block is to deal in detail about the four pramaṇas accepted by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school. But even in the understanding of the definition of pramāṇa in general or in particular, there are certain technical terms involved. For example the definition of pramāṇa involves reference to the term karaṇa; the latter is defined as asādhāranam kāraṇam. This leads us to the discussion regarding kāraṇa or cause and its varieties. The theory of causation which is implicitly mentioned in the explanation of the three different causes receives careful attention in the fifth unit. An extensive treatment of perception as a pramāṇa and the resultant cognition that arises from it, the various types of contacts that serve as causes for perceptual cognition, find place in the fifth unit. It is followed by a discussion of anupalabdhi as a distinct pramāṇa. Non - existence of pot (say) is comprehended by the sense of sight itself and hence anupalabdhi as a distinct pramāṇa need not be admitted. The sixth unit is devoted to the discussion regarding anumāna, its nature, its

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divisions, and other related details. The seventh unit comprises some allied topics from the anumāna section and also upamāna pramāṇa. The eighth and the last unit of this block relates to the pramāṇa - verbal testimony wherein the meaning function of words, causes of sentential sense, nature of words are all discussed. As such this block which consists of four units represents the epistemology of Nyāya system.

5.1 OBJECTIVES

The aim of Nyāya as that of all sciences being the attainment of truth, a knowledge of 'proofs' by which that truth is to be known is necessary according to the maxim mānādhīnā meyasiddhiḥ 'knowledge of the thing to be measured depends on a knowledge of the measure (instrument)'. Hence it will be useful first to examine the general nature of pramāṇa. The greater part of Nyāya writings is, therefore, devoted to a consideration of these proofs or means of valid knowledge. Annaṁbhaṭṭa follows Gautama in recognizing four pramāṇa-s but the assignment of each to the four divisions of pramā respectively seems to be his own improvement of pramāṇa which means pramākaraṇa on the basis of the explanation 'pramīyate anena iti' is 'the instrument of right apprehension'; This unit, therefore, is meant to discuss the foremost of the four means of valid knowledge viz., pratyakṣa. Since all knowledge is based on perceptual experience, it is being discussed primarily. Other related details such as the kinds of causes, types of anyathāsiddha are also discussed herein.

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5.1 TS-Fourfold Division of Pramā and Pramāṇa

यथार्थानुभवश्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्दभेदात्।

तत्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दभेदात्।।

त. दी - यथार्थानुभवं विभजते - **यथार्थेति**। प्रसङ्गात्प्रमाकरणं विभजते - **तत्करणमिति**। प्रमाकरणमित्यर्थः। प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम्।।

Valid knowledge or pramā is four kinds : pratyakṣa (perception) anumiti (inference) upamiti (analogy) and śābda (verbal testimony). The instruments of these valid cognitions are also of four kinds : pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda.

TSD - The author of TS sub-divides valid knowledge in (the expression) Valid knowledge ..... śabda. Contextually, he sub-divides the instruments of valid knowledge in (the expression) 'its instrument ..... etc' which means 'the instruments of valid cognition. The general definition of pramāṇa is that it is the instrument of valid knowledge or pramā. A diagramatic representation of pramā and pramāṇa is as follows :

	प्रत्यक्ष	अनुमिति	उपमिति	शाब्द
Pramā → (Resultant Cognition)	Pratyakṣa	- Anumiti	- Upamiti	- Śābda
	↑	↑	↑	↑
Pramāṇa → Means of valid knowledge	Pratyakṣa	- Anumāna	- Upamāna	- Śabda
	प्रत्यक्ष	अनुमान	उपमान	शब्द

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of ether being the cause of sound, it is thought of as a cause of pot. (iii) that factor which exists (uniformly) along with something which is an admitted (kḷpta) uniform antecedent elsewhere (anyatra) and from which it is possible for an effect to be produced is rendered dispensable with reference to that effect. e.g. (the antecedence) of the prior absence of colour (rūpaprāgabhāva) is rendered dispensable with reference to the "smell" that is due to pāka (or the contact of a unique kind of tejas). The nature of a 'cause' is thus constituted by in variable antecedence (niyatapūrvavṛttitva) which is free from dispensability (ananyathāsiddha).

Notes : A cause is that which is an invariable and indispensable antecedent of an effect which is the consequent. This definition implies three conditions to be fulfilled prior to an antecedent and consequent could be related as cause and effect. (i) in the first place the antecedent must be one which immediately precedes (avyavahitapūrvavṛtti) the consequent; (ii) the antecedent and the consequent must invariably co-exist; and (iii) the antecedent must also be an indispensable (ananyathasiddha) factor. If the cause were merely an immediate precedent then the definition of cause would be applicable to accidental antecedents like an ass which sometimes is used to bring clay, during the production of pot. To avoid this over-applicability the term 'invariable' is added in the definition. Even then in the case of cloth the effect which is preceded by threads - the cause is associated with the colour of the cloth and threadness. As such the latter two become invariable precedents of cloth, as the threads. But the Naiyāyikas consider the latter two as dispensable factors

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(anyathāsiddhas). This means that they could be viewed as the causes of cloth only by being related to the threads and not independently. Thus a cause must be one which is not an anyathāsiddha. In other words it must be ananyathāsiddha.

(2) By the second variety of anyathāsiddha, the Naiyāyikas bring 'ether' as anyathāsiddha. It is thus : ether which is eternal and all-pervasive may be treated as the cause of particular effects such as pot etc., That is, without leaving a single instance it would precede all the effects. The Naiyāyika overcomes this position by saying that ether in the first place is known as the cause of sound through the relation of inherence. Thus after knowing this fact of ether being the cause of sound, it is thought of as a cause of pot. Such a factor, viz., ether is considered as the second variety of anyathāsiddha and it may be dispensed with in the production of a pot.

(3) We have mentioned earlier that the four qualities of colour, taste etc., in earth are said to be non-eternal, due to their change effecting through pāka. In the production of these qualities, logically speaking, the prior non-existence (prāgabhāva) of the four qualities would respectively precede the rise of the four qualities. It is now asked : just as the prior non-existence of smell is the cause of smell, in the same way, the prior non-existence of colour etc., which would exist then may be viewed as the cause of smell. However it is only the prior non-existence of smell alone that is the cause of smell and other prior non-existence of colour etc., are treated as dispensable elements (anyathāsiddhas). Thus Annaṁbhaṭṭa sanctions that a factor which although associated with many other factors,

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yet is viewed to be a cause on the basis of its serving as a cause of a similar effect elsewhere (anyatra). Here, the other factors although are invariable precedents, yet are viewed to be dispensable elements. Viewed in this light, the prior non-existence of smell alone as is seen in 'other instances' is to be viewed as the cause of smell and the prior non-existence of colour etc., which although may precede smell, are treated to be dispensable elements. We shall show diagrammatically all the three varieties of anyathāsiddha thus :





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5.4 TS-THE DEFINITION OF KĀRYA OR EFFECT

कार्यं प्रागभावप्रतियोगि।।

त. दी. - कार्यलक्षणमाह - कार्यमिति।।

Effect is the counter - positive (pratiyogin) of its prior non-existence (prāgabhāva)

TSD - The author defines an effect by the sentence 'Effect is ..... etc'

5.5 TS-THREE KINDS OF CAUSES-DEFINED AND ANALYSED

कारणं त्रिविधं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात्। यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणम्। यथा तन्तवः पटस्य पटश्च स्वगतरूपादेः। कार्येण कारणेन वा सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति। यत्कारणं तदसमवायिकारणम्। यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्य तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य। तदुभयभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणम्। यथा तुरीवेमादिकं पटस्य।

Cause is of three kinds. They are (i) inherent cause (ii) non-inherent cause, and, (ii) efficient cause. Inherent cause is that in which an effect comes into existence through the relation of inherence (samavāya). A cloth comes into existence through the relation of inherence in the threads; so the threads constitute the inherent cause of the cloth. Likewise, the colour of the cloth comes into existence in the cloth (a moment later than the cloth is produced) and hence cloth is the inherent cause of the colour of the cloth. Non-inherent cause is that which by being present in the inherent cause, produces the effect through the relation of inherence in the inherent cause. Conjunction of threads constitutes the non-inherent cause. It is present in the threads through the relation of inherence and is the cause responsible for the cloth through the relation of inherence in the threads. In the same way, the colour of the threads

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..is the non-inherent cause of the colour of the cloth.

An efficient cause is that state which is different from either an inherent cause or a non-inherent cause. Shuttle or the loom etc., are the efficient causes (of cloth).

TSD - Two Kinds of Non-Inherent Cause

त.दी - कारणं विभजते - **कारणमिति**। समवायिकारणस्य लक्षणमाह **यत्समवेतमिति**। यस्मिन्समवेतमित्यर्थः। असमवायिकारणं लक्षयति **कार्येणेति**। कार्येणेत्येतदुदाहरति **तन्तुसंयोग इति**। कार्येण पटेनैकस्मिंस्तन्तौ समवेतत्वात्तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः। कारणेन सहेत्येतदुदाहरति - **तन्तुरूपमिति**। कारणेन पटेन सहैकस्मिंस्तन्तौ समवेतत्वात्तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः। निमित्तकारणं लक्षयति **तदुभयेति**। समवाय्यसमवायिभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः।।

The author sub-divides 'cause' in (the statement) 'cause is ..... He gives the definition of samavāyi-karaṇa (inherent cause) in (the statment) that in which an effect (comes into existence) by being related through inherence. The (TS) gives the definition of asamavāyikāraṇa in (the sentence) 'Non-inherent cause is that which by ..... It illustrates the (first variety of) non-inherent cause kāryeṇasaha etc., and the conjunction of threads which serves as a cause of the cloth is a variety of this. The conjunction of threads inhering (related through samavāya) along with the cloth in the self-same-threads is the asamavāyikāraṇa of cloth. (TS) illustrates 'along with the cause (kāraṇenasaha) by colour of the threads (tanturūpa). The colour of the thread which inheres in the self-same thread along with the cloth which is the cause (i.e., samavāyikāraṇa of the the colour of the cloth is the asamavāyikāraṇa of the colour of the cloth. TS defines nimittakāraṇa in (the sentence) 'the cause that is other than both ..... The meaning is that which is other than

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the samavāyikāraṇa and the asamavāyikāraṇa is the nimittakāraṇa.

Notes : Generally speaking, causes can be grouped under two heads as material cause and efficient cause. Almost all the Indian philosophers have admitted these two kinds of causes. But the Nyāya school conceives inherent cause (samavāyikāraṇa) in the place of the material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) admitted by the other schools. They also add one more cause namely, non-inherent cause (asamavāyikāraṇa). Thus there are three kinds of cause viz., inherent cause, non-inherent cause and efficient cause. Of these, substances alone can serve as inherent causes. Either quality or activity could serve as non-inherent cause. Efficient causality is not limited to anything particularly. It is that which is different from the two causes. It may be known that the whole substances (avayavin) have as their inherent cause parts (avayavas). The former arises in the latter through the relation of samavāya. This is the principle governing the inherent cause. It may be diagramatically represented as follows :



There are two types of **asamavāyikāraṇa.** The first variety of **asamavāyikāraṇa** is where the conjunction of parts serve as the cause of the whole-substance.



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Kārya here is पटं or घट तेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे = एकस्मिन्नधिकरणे तन्तुसंयोगः समवेतं समवायसंबन्धेन वर्तमानं सत् पटं प्रति कारणम्। अतः तन्तुसंयोगः असमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः।

The second variety of asamavāyikāraṇa can be explained, where the qualities present in the parts (substances) (avayavas) produce a similar kind of qualities (svasamānajātiya guṇāntara) in the whole-substances. Since the nyāya school holds that the effect does not pre-exist in its cause the theory of causation is known as asatkāryavāda or ārambhavāda. Thus even if the red coloured threads give rise to a cloth, it is not the same red colour that manifests in the cloth. On the otherhand the red colour of the threads produces a similar kind of red colour in the cloth. Let us show by means of one or two examples, diagrammatically.



The second variety of **asamavāyikāraṇa** specifies कारणेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतं सत् कारणम्। Here the word कारणेन means स्वकार्यसमवायिकारणेन। स्वं stands for the cause in question. In the diagrams (A) (B) above, the effect (कार्य) is the colour of the cloth (पटरूपं) and the colour of the pot **(ghaṭarūpa)** respectively. स्वं stands for **tanturūpa** and **kapālarūpa**. Hence स्वकार्य refers to पटरूप and घटरूप. The inherent cause of these two respectively are पट and घट. Thus by the

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expression स्वकार्यसमवायिकारण we arrive at पट and घट। तेन - पटेन घटेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे = तन्तौ, कपाले च समवेतं सत् = समवायसंबन्धेन वर्तमानं सत्, तन्तुरूपं, कपालरूपं च कारणे भवतः।

5.6 TS-THE DEFINITION OF 'KARAṆA' CLARIFIED

तदेतत्त्रिविधकारणमध्ये यदसाधारणं कारणं तदेव करणम्।।

त दी - करणलक्षणमुपसंहरति - **तदेतदिति**।।

Of the three kinds of causes (mentioned above) that which is the unique cause (asādhāraṇakāraṇa) that alone is termed karaṇa.

TSD - The author brings to a close the discussion about the definition of karaṇa.

5.7 TS-DEFINITION OF PERCEPTUAL COGNITION (PRATYAKṢAJNĀNA) AND ITS TWO FOLD DIVISION INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE COGNITION

तत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षम्। इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्। तत् द्विविधं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं चेति। तत्र निष्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकं यथेदं किंचित्। सप्रकारकं ज्ञानं सविकल्पकं यथा डित्थोऽयं ब्राह्मणोऽयं श्यामोऽयमिति।।

Of the (four kinds of valid knowledge) that which is the cause of valid perceptual knowledge is termed perception (pratyakṣa). Perceptual knowledge is that which arises due to contact of sense-organs with respective object. It is of two kinds : nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate). Of them, indeterminate cognition is one which is not characterized by any adjectival feature (prakāra). e.g. 'This is something'. Determinate cognition is that which is characterized by an adjectival feature e.g., 'This is a Dittha', 'This is a Brāhmaṇa', 'This is black etc.,

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त. दी. - प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमाह - तत्रेति। प्रमाणचतुष्टयमध्य इत्यर्थः। प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य लक्षणमाह - इन्द्रियेएति। इन्द्रियं चक्षुरादिकम्। अर्थो घटादिः। तयोः संनिकर्षः संयोगादिः तज्जन्यं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः।। तद्विभजते - 'तत् द्विविधमिति। निर्विकल्पकस्य लक्षणमाह - निष्प्रकारकमिति। विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धानवगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः।।

TSD - TS gives the definition of 'pratyakṣa' as cognition in (the words) 'perceptual knowledge is that .....'. Here the word tatra - refers to 'Of the four kinds of pramāṇa'. Indriya (sense-organ) is such as sense of sight etc. Object (artha) is (a thing like) pot etc.; the relation between the two is such as conjunction etc. The cognition that results from such relation is known as perceptual cognition. The author sub-divides perception (in the statement) 'It is of two kinds. The author gives the definition of 'nirvikalpaka' (jñana) as niṣprakārakajñana i.e., to say, it is the cognition wherein the viśeṣaṇa, viśeṣya and saṁbandha are not manifested.

Notes : When the sense of sight comes into contact with an object (say) pot, there arises the cognition and the corresponding expression as 'This is pot'. Here pot (ghaṭa) is the viśeṣya (substantive feature) ghaṭatva (potness) is viśeṣaṇa or prakāra (adjectival feature) the relation between the two being samavāya. Now, in an indeterminate cognition, when one sees a pot without prior knowledge of it, would no doubt perceive pot and potness. But these two would not manifest as the substantive and adjectival feature respectively. This is precisely the reason why he is not able to express it as 'This is pot' but only as 'This is something'.

TSD - Proof for the Existence of Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa

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ननु निर्विकल्पके किं प्रमाणमिति चेन्न। गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञानं विशेषणज्ञानजन्यं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वाद्दण्डीति ज्ञानवदित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात्। विशेषणज्ञानस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गान्निर्विकल्पकसिद्धिः।। सविकल्पकं लक्षयति - **सत्प्रकारकमिति**। नामजात्यादिविशेषणविशेष्य-संबन्धावगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः। सविकल्पकमुदाहरति - **यथेति**।।

If it is asked as to what is the proof in respect of indeterminate congnition. (That is to say the opponent feels that there is no proof). It is answered 'No', for, inference serves as the proof. The inference is : The complex cognition (viśiṣṭajñāna) of the form 'This is cow', arises fror the knowledge of the adjectival feature (viśeṣaṇa), because it is a complex congntion like the complex cognition of a man with a staff. If the knowledge of the adjectival feature also is admitted to be determinate in nature, (we may have to admit another cognition for its rise and so on) then there would arise infinite regress (anavasthā). Hence the cognition which gives rise to the complex cognition is decidedly taken to be nirvikalpaka. The author defines savikalpaka (jñāna) as that which has adjectival features (saprakāraka) i.e., to say (it is) the cognition that has for its content (an object) a name, and universal etc., an adjectival feature and its relation to the substantive feature. The author gives example for savikalpaka 'This is ..... etc'.

5.8 TS-Sannikarṣa (control) and its six varieties.

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुरिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः षड्विधः। संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः समवेतसमवायो विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्चेति। चक्षुषा घटप्रत्यक्षजनने संयोगः संनिकर्षः। घटरूपप्रत्यक्षजनने संयुक्तसमवायः संनिकर्षः चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य समवायात्। रूपत्वसामान्यप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः संनिकर्षः। चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवायात्। श्रोत्रेण शब्दसाक्षात्कारे समवायः संनिकर्षः

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कर्णविवरवृत्त्याकाशस्य श्रोत्रत्वात् शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वात् गुणगुणिनोश्च समवायात्। शब्दत्वसाक्षात्कारे समवेतसमवायः संनिकर्षः श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वस्य समवायात्। अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यभावः संनिकर्षो घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र चक्षुःसंयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात्। एवं संनिकर्षषट्कजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्। तत्करणमिन्द्रियम्। तस्मादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमिति सिद्धम्।।

The sense - object relation which generates a perceptual cognition is of six types, namely, (i) conjunction, (saṁyoga); (ii) inherence in what is conjoined (saṁyuktasamavāya); (iii) inherence in what is inherent in a thing which is conjoined (saṁyuktasamavetasamavāya); (iv) inherence (samavāya); (v) inherence in an inherent thing (samaveta samavāya) and adjunct-substantive relation (viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyabhāva). (Of these six types of relations) in regard to the perceptual knowledge of substances (say) pot (the first type of sannikarṣa) saṁyoga or conjunction is the cause. With regard to what are inherent in pot (say) colour etc., samyuktasamavāya is the cause. It is because colour is inherent in pot which is conjoined with the sense of sight. In the case of the perceptual cognition of the universal - rūpatva, saṁyuktasaṁavetasamavāya is the contact for, in pot which is conjoined with the sense of sight, colour is inherent; therein colourness is inherent. With regard to the auditory perception of sound by the sense of hearing, samavāya or inherence is the contact. It is because the sense of hearing is nothing but "ether" conditioned by the cavity of the ear (कर्णविवर) and sound being a quality, ether being a substance there is the relation of inherence between them. In regard to the perception of soundness (śabdatva) the relation is samaveta samavāya for, sound which is related to the sense of hearing through inherence

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has soundness through inherence. In regard to the perception of non-existence, the adjunct-substantive relation is the contact. In the case of the cognition 'The floor has the absence of pot' the contact through which one comprehends the pot is known as saṁyuktaviśeṣaṇatā. It is because, pot which is conjoined with the sense of sight manifests as an adjective on the floor. Thus perception is that which arises through these six types of contacts. The instrument of it is the sense organ. Hence the sense-organ is termed pratyakṣapramāṇa.

Notes : A diagrammatic representation of the above six types of contacts is given below.



There is a rule यो गुणः यदिन्द्रियग्राह्यः तन्निष्ठाजातिः तदभावश्च तेनैव इन्द्रियेण ग्राह्यः। This means that an universal belonging to a quality and their absence (quality and universal) also would be comprehended by the same sense-organ. Hence if

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colour is comprehended by the sense of sight, the universal - colourness, their absence also is comprehended by the sense of sight.

4. श्रोत्रम् ⟶ समवायः ⟶ शब्दप्रत्यक्षम्
कर्णविवरवर्त्ति आकाशः
श्रोत्रम् (द्रव्यम्) शब्दः
गुणि (गुणगुणिनोः समवायः) गुणः

5. श्रोत्रम् ⟶ समवेतसमवायः ⟶ शब्दं ⟶ शब्दत्वप्रत्यक्षम् / समवायः (जाति व्यक्त्योः समवाय इति नियमात्)

6. चक्षुः ⟶ विशेषणविशेष्यभावः
अर्थात् विशेषणतासन्निकर्षः ⟶ घटाभाव
विशेष्यतासन्निकर्षश्च प्रत्यक्षम्

Here, the absence of pot on the floor could be expressed in two ways in Sanskrit (1) भूतलं घटाभाववत् (2) भूतले घटाभावः। Although the content of both these is the same yet, the expressions refer to difference due to the difference in the status of घटाभाव. In the first statement. absence of pot (घटाभाव) manifests as विशेषण while in the second it manifests as विशेष्य (Whichever is in the nominative case is the विशेष्य) Thus if one has the cognition of घटाभाव and the corresponding expression is भूतलं घटाभाववत्, then the contact is संयुक्तविशेषणता (चक्षुस्संयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात्). If, however, it takes the form भूतले घटाभावः then the contact is संयुक्तविशेष्यता (चक्षुस्संयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य विशेष्यत्वात्). While the sense of sight and touch could comprehend the absence of both substances as well as qualities, the remaining sense organs could comprehend the qualities alone but not of substances.

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TSD-THE PROBLEM OF TRANSMISSION OF SOUND

ते. दी. - इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षं विभजते - **प्रत्यक्षेति**। संयोगसंनिकर्षमुदाहरति - **चक्षुषेति**। द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे सर्वत्र संनिकर्ष इत्यर्थः। आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते, मन इन्द्रियेण इन्द्रियमर्थेन ततः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। संयुक्तसमवायमुदाहरति - **घटरूपेति**। तत्र युक्तिमाह - **चक्षुः - संयुक्त** इति। संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायमुदाहरति - **रूपत्वेति**। समवायमुदाहरति - **श्रोत्रेणेति**। तदुपपादयति - **कर्णेति**। ननु दूरस्थशब्दस्य कथं श्रोत्रसंबन्ध इति चेन्न वीचितरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा शब्दाच्छब्दान्तरोत्पत्तिक्रमेण श्रोत्रदेशे जातस्य शब्दस्य श्रोत्रसंबन्धात्प्रत्यक्षत्वसंभवात्। समवेतसमवायमुदाहरति - **शब्दत्वेति**। विशेषणविशेष्यभावमुदाहरति - **अभावेति**। तदुपपादयति - घटाभाववदिति। भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यत्र घटाभावस्य विशेष्यत्वं द्रष्टव्यम्। The author sub-divides sense - object contact in [the expression] ' The sense - object relation ..... etc. He illustrates the relation of conjunction in the expression 'in regard to the perception ..... ' This implies that in the case of the perceptual cognition of substances, it is always conjunction that is the [operative] relation. [The order in which a cognition arises is this] The self gets related [through conjunction] to mind, mind with a sense - organ [indriya] ; the sense - organ with an object ; and then is produced perceptual cognition. The author illustrates [the relation of] inherence - in - the conjoined in [the expression] ' For the perception of the colour of a pot ..... ' He gives the ground in [the expression] ' The reason is that ..... ' The author illustrates [the relation of] ' inherence - in - the inherent in the conjoined in [the expression] ' For the perception of the universal ' Colourless ..... ' The author illustrates [the relation of] ' inherence ' in [the expression] For the perception of sound ..... ' He gives the justification in [the expression] ' The reason is that Ākāśa ..... '

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It may be contended, that there cannot be a [direct] relation between the sound at a distance and the ear [as a sense - organ]. It is replied ' No '. In accordance with the maxim (nyāya) of ' ripples and waves ' (vīcītaraṅganyāya) or of Kadaṁba - petals (kadambamukulanyāya) there may be successive genesis of one sound from another sound ; and since what is generated in the space of the ear has a [direct] relation with the ear, there is the possibility of its getting perceived. The author illustrates [the relation of] ' inherence in the inherent ' in [the expression] For the perception of the universal, soundness ..... '. The author illustrates the relation adjunct - substantive in the expression ' For the perception of some absence ..... ' He elucidates in [the expression] ' the reason is that the absence of a pot ..... .

The ground (bhūtala) is the viśeṣya, the absence of pot (ghaṭābhāva) is the viśeṣaṇa; in cases, however, like 'the pot is not on the ground', the absence is to be taken as the viśeṣya.

5.9 Examination of Anupalabdhi as a Distinct Pramāṇa

एतेनानुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वं निरस्तम्। यद्यत्र घटोऽभविष्यत्तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यत। दर्शनाभावान्नास्तीति तर्कितप्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोध्यनुपलब्धि-सहकृतेन्द्रियेणैवाभावज्ञानोपपत्तौ अनुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वासंभवात्। अधिकरणज्ञानार्थमपेक्षणीयेन्द्रियस्यैव करणत्वोपपत्तावनुपलब्धेः करणत्वस्यायुक्तत्वात्। विशेषणविशेष्यभावो विशेषणविशेष्यस्वरूपमेव नातिरिक्तः संबन्धः। प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमुपसंहरस्तस्य करणमाह - **एवमिति**। असाधारणकारणत्वादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणमित्यर्थः। प्रत्यक्षमुपसंहरति - तस्मादिति ।।

Non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as a pramāṇa or a special means of knowledge distinct from the remaining

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pramāṇas is repudiated. Anupalabdhi cannot possibly be (accepted as) a distinctive means of cognition, for, the absence of an object could be comprehended by the sense-organ itself with anupalabdhi as an auxiliary cause. The argument is as follows : if there were the presence of pot on the floor then it would have been perceived (as the floor is perceived); but it is not perceived; hence pot does not exist on the floor. Thus anupalabdhi which goes counter (virodhi) to the presence of the counter-positive (pratiyogisattva) that is entailed by a hypothetical argument mentioned above, becomes only an auxiliary cause to the sense organ which alone perceives the absence. If the sense-organ which is required for the perception of the substratum can serve as the special means for the cognition of absence too, then it would be improper to admit anupalabdhi as a special means (for such cognition).

The relation of adjunct-substantive (viśeṣana-viśeṣya) is of the nature of the viśeṣaṇa and viśeṣya and is not any additional relation.

In concluding the discussion on perceptual cognition, the author indicates its special means (karaṇa) in (the expression) 'Thus perception is the cognition for that is its unique cause (kāraṇa). The author concludes (his discussion on) pratyakṣa with the words 'Thus sense-organ is decidedly known as .....'

Notes : According to the Advaitins non-apprehension is considered as a pramāṇa to comprehend the non-existence of an object. But they admit that the non-existence which is perceived in a substratum has the sense organ as its instrument only in giving rise to the knowledge of the substratum viz., floor and the absence is comprehended by

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a distinct pramāṇa known as anupalabdhi. The Naiyāyikas on the other hand are of the view that it is the sense-organ which comprehends the substratum of absence, itself comprehends the absence too. Thus, the sense-organs are the instruments of valid knowledge of absence, and anupalabdhi is only an auxiliary cause or anyathāsiddha or dispensable factor according to the Nyāya school. But for the Advaitins, anupalabdhi is the instrument and the function of the sense organs lies only in giving rise to the knowledge of the substratum of absence and to comprehend the absence there on anupalabdhipramāṇa operates.

5.10 Let us Sum Up

(i) Cause is an invariable antecedent of the effect. Causes are of three kinds, as inherent, non-inherent and efficient. Substances are always inherent causes. Qualities or activities serve as non-inherent causes. Among the three causes, the most unique cause is known as Karaṇa.

(ii) Pramāṇa is the instrument of valid knowledge. Perception, Inference, Analogy and Verbal Testimony are the four kinds of Pramāṇas.

(iii) Perceptual knowledge arises from the sense-organs coming into contact with respective objects.

(iv) The sense-object contact that generates perceptual knowledge are admitted to be six.

(v) Perception is of two kinds as indeterminate and determinate.

(vi) Anupalabdhi or non-apprehension is not treated to be a distinct Pramāṇa to comprehend absence, but

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it is the sense organ itself which is pratyakṣapramāṇa that comprehends absence.

5.11 Self - Assessment Questions

1. How is a cause defined ?
2. Causes are of three kinds. What are they ?
3. How do we identify the different kinds of causes ?
4. What is meant by karaṇa ?
5. What are the four kinds of Pramā or Yathārthānubhava ?
6. Explain the six types of contact (sannikarṣa) that generate perceptual knowledge ?
7. What are the two kinds of non-inherent cause ?
8. What are the two types of perception ?
9. Is anupalabdhi a distinct pramāṇa ? If not why ?
10. Explain the notion of anyathāsiddhi and its varieties ?
11. What are the two ways of transmission of sound ?

5.12 Key Words

1. Pramā 2. Pramāṇa 3. Karaṇa 4. Samavāyikāraṇa 5. Asamavāyikāraṇa 6. Nimittakāraṇa 7. Anyathāsiddhi 8. Nirvikalpaka 9. Savikalpaka 10. Sannikarṣa 11. Vīcītaraṅganyāya 12. Kadaṁbamukulanyāya 13. anupalabdhi

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NOTES :

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UNIT-6
INFERENCE - ANUMĀNA

STRUCTURE

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(b) Analysis of Pakṣatā.
6.3 TS - The Definition of Vyāpti (Invariable Relation)
TS - The Definition of Pakṣadharmatā
TSD - Definition of Vyāpti Analysed.
6.4 TS - Anumāna for oneself (svārthānumāna) and Anumāna for others (parārthānumāna) The former analysed.
TSD - Means of comprehending Vyāpti (Vyāptigrahopāya)
6.5 TS - Analysis of Parārthānumāna; five membered syllogism (pañcāvayavavākya)
TSD - Definition and Function of each of the five avayavas.
6.6 TS - Liṇgaparāmarśa - karaṇa for both kinds of anumiti.
TSD (a) Need for Admitting Parāmarśa
(b) Definition of Karaṇa - refined
(c) Liṇgajñāna or Liṇga - as the Karaṇa of anumiti.
6.7 TS - Three kinds of Liṅga classified, defined and explained.
TSD - The problem of 'Kevala-vyatireki hetu'
6.8 TS - Pakṣa, Sapakṣa and Vipakṣa defined and illustrated
TSD - The definition of Pakṣa examined.
6.9 Let us sum up
6.10 Self Check questions
6.11 Key Words

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UNIT-5
INFERENCE - ANUMĀNA

6.0 OBJECTIVES

The chief objective of this unit lies in explaining Anumāna or inferential cognition as the second means of valid knowledge. Anumāna as its etymological sense indicates, is after-proof. It is after-proof in the sense that it uses the knowledge derived from perception or helps the mind to march on further and add to its knowledge. When anumāna as a proof is challenged by the Cārvākas, the Naiyāyikas convince them and prove anumāna as a pramāṇa. For this purpose itself they make use of an inferential cognition. Although this unit involves a vast number of technical terms yet a little more attention to this unit would certainly prove useful in understanding allied texts and Vedānta classics. Before starting the text proper we shall take some space for some preliminary considerations.

6.1 Preliminary Considerations

As students of Nyāya, before you proceed to study the chapter on anumāna, you should start with a clear conception of the meanings of the technical terms such as pakṣa, sādhya and hetu or sādhana. Of these, pakṣa is the subject of inference, hetu is the ground of inference and sādhya is that which is sought to be proved in the pakṣa. To explain : pakṣa stands for the subject of inference with reference to which something has to be inferred or inferentially predicated; the term sādhya corresponds to the

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thing that is sought to be inferentially predicated with reference to pakṣa; and the term hetu or sādhana stands for the reason or ground which is invariably concomitant with what is sought to be inferred and whose knowledge leads to inference. Thus, for example, in the inferential cognition 'The mountain has fire because it has smoke'. mountain is the pakṣa, fire is the sādhya and smoke is the hetu. Let us first understand the process in which an inferential cognition arises. There are four stages involved in its rise which are as follows :

(1) One sees smoke coming out of a hill - This knowledge which one has of smoke (hetu) in a hill (pakṣa) is known as pakṣadharmatājñāna. The latter is defined as the knowledge of the hetu in the pakṣa.

(2) The knowledge of smoke reminds one of the invariable relation of smoke to fire in the form 'wherever there is smoke there is fire'. This knowledge of invariable relation is known as Vyāptijñana.

(3) There arises a complex cognition called parāmarśa (subsumptive reflection) of the form 'smoke which is invariably related to fire is present in the mountain'. This cognition is only a combination of the earlier two cognitions, viz., pakṣadharmatājñāna, and vyāptijñāna.

(4) There arises the inferential cognition 'The Mountain has fire'.

Now, in the second stage of recollecting the invariable relation of smoke to fire, this knowledge of invariable

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relation may arise in two different forms. It is because, there are two types of vyāpti.

(1) Anvayavyāpti (2) Vyatirekavyāpti. Of these anvayavyāpti or relation between two positive factors is one which is expressed between the hetu and the sādhya (hetusādhyayoḥ vyāptiḥ); vyatirekavyāpti or relation between two negative factors is one which is expressed between the sādhyābhāva and the hetvabhāva (sādhyābhāva hetvabhāvayoḥ vyāptiḥ). The first one is of the form "wherever there is smoke there is fire" (yatra yatra dhūmaḥ tatra tatra vahniḥ). Two factors are said to have vyāpti (invariable relation) of which one will be vyāpya and the other vyāpaka. Vyāpya means less pervasive and vyāpaka is more pervasive. Again in a vyāpti we always utter the vyāpya first and then the vyāpaka. Viewed in this light, in an anvayavyāpti between smoke and fire, smoke is less pervasive (vyāpya) and fire is more pervasive (vyāpaka). While expressing the anvayavyāpti we utter smoke (vyāpya) first and fire (vyāpaka) next. Now consider the following :

अन्वयव्याप्तिः - हेतु साध्ययोः व्याप्तिः

यत्र धूमः ↓ व्याप्यः (less pervasive)

तत्र वह्निः ↓ व्यापकः (more pervasive)

इत्यन्वयव्याप्तिः

Smoke cannot exist independent of fire whereas fire can do so in a glowing iron rod. Hence smoke is less pervasive than fire.

धूमः व्याप्यश्चेत् कस्य ? वह्नेः। अतः धूमः वह्निव्याप्यः वह्नि व्याप्यत्वं धूमे। सामान्यतः साध्यव्याप्यः हेतुः अथवा साध्यव्याप्यत्वं हेतौ।

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तथा वह्निः व्यापकश्चेत् कस्य ? धूमस्य। अतः धूमव्यापकः वह्निः, धूमव्यापकत्वं वह्नौ। सामान्यरूपेण वक्तव्यश्चेत् हेतुव्यापकः साध्यः अथवा हेतुव्यापकत्वं साध्ये। The following diagram will help you understand this concept

(a) General

(a) हेतुः साध्यः

व्याप्यः

(b) हेतौ साध्य

व्याप्यत्वम्

(b) Specific Instance

(a) धूमः वह्निः

व्याप्यः

(b) धूमे वह्नि

व्याप्यत्वम्

If धूम is वह्निव्याप्य, it implies वह्नि is धूमव्यापक

(a) General

(a) हेतु साध्यः

व्यापकः

(b) हेतु वह्नौ

व्यापकत्वं

(b) Specific Instance

(a) धूम वह्निः

व्यापकः

(b) धूम वह्नौ

व्यापकत्वम्

Similarly we shall explain Vyatirekavyāpti. साध्याभावहेत्वभावयोः व्याप्तिः व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः। In Vyatirekavyāpti, since the sādhyābhāva is less pervasive it is uttered first and then the hetvabhāva which is more pervasive. Here absence of fire (sādhyābhāva) is less pervasive when compared to absence of smoke (hetvabhāva). It is thus : absence of smoke exists wherever there is absence of fire, and there is absence of smoke even where there is fire (in a glowing iron rod). Hence absence of smoke exists

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independent of absence of fire and thus the former is more pervasive. Vyatirekavyāpti may be represented as follows :

(a) General

(a) साध्याभावः हेत्वभावः

व्यापकः

(b) साध्याभाव हेत्वभावे

व्यापकत्वम्

(b) Specific Instance

(a) वह्न्यभावः धूमाभावः

व्यापकः

(b) वह्न्यभावः धूमाभावे

व्यापकत्वम्

If हेत्वभावः (धूमाभावः) is वह्न्यभावव्यापकः, it implies वह्न्यभाव is हेत्वभाव (धूमाभाव) व्याप्यः।

(a) General

(a) साध्याभावः हेत्वभावः

व्याप्यः

(b) साध्याभावे हेत्वभाव

व्याप्यत्वम्

(b) Specific Instance

(a) वह्न्याभावः धूमाभावः

व्याप्यः

(b) वह्न्यभावे धूमाभाव

व्याप्यत्वम्

We have mentioned earlier that in the second stage of the rise of anumiti, one recollects the invariable relation of smoke (hetu) to fire (sādhya). This recollection may be the invariable relation of the positive factors (anvayavyāpti) or the negative factors (vyatirekavyāpti). If one recollects the anvayavyāpti then one would have the cognition of the form 'dhūmo vahnivyāpyaḥ' or vahnivyāpyaḥ dhūmaḥ'. In the first stage, there has arisen pakṣadharmatājñāna of the

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form 'parvato dhūmavān'. Now, in the third stage when these two cognition are combined to have one complex cognition called parāmarśa, it takes the form 'vahnivyāpyadhumavānayam parvataḥ'. If we analyse this cognition, we would know that the first part represents vyāptijñāna and the latter part refers to pakṣadharmatājñāna. As regards the definition of pakṣatā, sapakṣa, vipakṣa etc., we shall have detailed discussion in the text proper. This preliminary note is very important and try to understand these concepts perfectly.

6.2 TS - The Definitions of Anumāna, Anumiti and Parāmarśa

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम्। परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः। व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः। यथा वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानं परामर्शः। तज्जन्यं पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिः।

Anumāna (Inference) is the efficient instrument (karaṇa) of inferential cognition (anumiti). Inferential cognition arises from subsumptive reflection (parāmarśa). Parāmarśa is a cognition which comprehends the hetu which has the vyāpti with the sādhya, in the pakṣa. It is of the form 'smoke which is invariably related to fire is present in the mountain'. This is known as parāmarśa. From this knowledge there arises anumiti of the form 'The Mountain has Fire'.

TSD (a) The Definition of Anumiti Examined

(b) Analysis of Pakṣatā

त. दी. - अनुमानं लक्षयति - **अनुमितिकरणमिति**। अनुमितेर्लक्षणमाह - **परामर्शेति**। ननु संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिः स्थाणुपुरुषसंशयानन्तरं पुरुषत्वव्याप्यकरादिमानयमिति परामर्शे सति पुरुष एवेति प्रत्यक्षजननात्। न च तत्रानुमितिरेवेति वाच्यम्। "पुरुषं साक्षात्करोमि"

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इत्यनुव्यवसायविरोधादिति चेन्न। पक्षतासहकृतपरामर्शजन्यत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्ध्यभावः पक्षता। साध्यसिद्धिरनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका। सिद्धिसत्त्वेऽप्यनुमिनुयामीतीच्छायामनुमितिदर्शनात् सिषाधयिषोत्तेजका। ततश्चोत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमण्यभावस्य दाहकारणत्ववत् सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्ध्यभावस्याप्यनुमितिकारणत्वम्। परामर्शं लक्षयति - **व्याप्तीति**। व्याप्तिविषयकं यत्पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं स परामर्श इत्यर्थः। परामर्शमभिनीय दर्शयति - **यथेति**। अनुमितिमभिनयति - **तज्जन्यमिति**। परामर्शजन्यमित्यर्थः।।

The author defines anumāna in (the words) 'Anumāna is the efficient instrument .....". He gives the definition of "anumiti" in (the expression) 'anumiti is that which arises .....'. This definition of anumiti is over applicable in a perception that arises after a doubt (saṁśayottarapratyakṣa) of the form 'Is it a lamp-post or a man ? One has the parāmarśa of the form 'This has hands etc., which are invariably associated with manhood". From this parāmarśa there arises the perception of the form. 'This is only a man'. It cannot be questioned that it is only an inferential cognition. It is because the reflective cognition (anuvyavasāya) which one has in the form 'I have the direct apprehension of man' would not be intelligible. The (Naiyāyikas) answer by saying that when it is said that parāmarśa gives rise to anumiti, what is intended is that parāmarśa as associated with pakṣatā gives rise to anumiti. (What is Pakṣatā ?) The Naiyāyikas define it thus : a person actually perceives fire in the hill. He has thus certainty about the existence of the sādhya. In other words, there is siddhi. Normally this would prevent him from inferring the fire. But if he has the desire to infer (siṣādhayiṣā), then siddhi which prevented the rise of the process of inference is checked by the desire to infer

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allowing inference to take place. The desire to infer is known as uttejaka. Thus pakṣatā consists in the absence of siddhi as associated with absence of desire to infer. (Here) the certainty about the presence of the sādhya is the counteracting factor of (the rise of) anumiti. Even in the presence of siddhi if the desire to infer exists there would arise anumiti. Thus siṣādhayiṣā is one which produces the result even in the presence of the counteracting factor (siddhi). Hence siṣadhayiṣā is called uttejaka. ततश्चोत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमण्यभावस्य दाहकारणत्ववत् - serves as an analogy. Fire when touched burns the hand. But when touched with a gem in one's hand it does not do so. Hence we conclude that a gem is a counteracting factor. But in the presence of a gem, if a mantra or medicine is kept, the very same fire burns the hand. Thus a mantra, because it activates the fire to burn, even in the presence of a gem, it is known as uttejaka. Thus it may be known that mere gem is not the counteracting factor but it is only the gem as associated with absence of uttejaka, that is considered to be so. Hence the absence of such a gem as associated with the absence of uttejaka is considered as the cause of burning.

1. वह्निः ⟶ दाहं प्रतिकारणम्
2. वह्निः + मणिः (प्रतिबन्धिका) ⟶ दाहः न जायते
3. मन्त्र (उत्तेजक) + वह्नि + मणि ⟶ दाहः जायते

.अतः उत्तेजकाभाव विशिष्टमणेः प्रतिबन्धकत्वम् तादृशमणेरभावः दाहं प्रति कारणम्।

Likewise in pakṣata.

1. साध्यसिद्धिः प्रतिबन्धिका = पक्षता न - अनुमिति नास्ति।
2. सिषाधयिषा + सिद्धि - अनुमितिरस्ति

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सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्धेः प्रतिबन्धकत्वम् तादृशसिद्धेरभावः पक्षता साऽनुमित्युत्पादिका

The author defines parāmarśa in (the words) parāmarśa is a cognition which comprehends ..... That is, parāmarśa is the knowledge of the presence of the hetu in the pakṣa and the knowledge of invariable relation of that hetu to the sādhya. The author describes (the nature of) parāmarśa in (the words) 'eg. the cognition like ..... fire'. He describes the nature of inference (anumiti) in (the words) 'From this knowledge anumiti ....., arising from it means 'arising from parāmarśa'.

6.3 TS - The Definition of Vyāpti (Invariable Relation)

यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः।

'Wherever there is smoke there is fire' - this type of invariable concomitance is vyāpti.

TS - The Definition of Pakṣadharmata

व्याप्यस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता।

Pakṣadharmatā (subject - adjunctness) consists in the vyāpya (ground of inference) being present in things like a mountain (which serve as ground of inference).

TSD - Definition of Vyāpti Analysed

व्याप्तेर्लक्षणमाह - यत्रेति। यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति व्याप्तेरभिनयः। साहचर्यनियम इति लक्षणम्। साहचर्यं सामानाधिकरण्यं तस्य नियमः। हेतुसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः पक्षधर्मतास्वरूपमाह - **व्याप्यस्येति**।

The author gives the definition of vyāpti in (the words) where there is ..... (The TS passage) 'where there is

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smoke there is fire' is the verbal expression (abhinaya = abhilāpakaśabda) of the rule (vyāpti). Rule of concomitance is the defining attribute (of vyāpti). Invariable concomitance is co-existence (sāmānādhikaraṇya) in the same substratum. In other words vyāpti is the co-existence of the hetu with the sādhya which does not become the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of the absence that exists in the substratum of the hetu*. The author describes the nature of Paleṣadharmatā in the words 'The presence of the vyāpya.... etc.,

***Notes** : Pratiyogin means counter-positive of an absence यस्य अभावः सः प्रतियोगि। घटस्य अभावः चेत् घटः प्रतियोगि। If vyāpti is merely stated as sādhyasāmānādhikaraṇyam, co-presence of the sādhya with the hetu in the same substratum then in a glowing iron-rod where fire is present smoke does not exist. Hence the definition of vyāpti is open to the defect of asambhava (total inapplicability). Hence the sādhya is prefixed with the adjective "hetu samānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvāpratiyogi". This means that the sādhya should be one which does not become the pratiyogin for the abhāva that would exist in the substratum of the hetu.



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6.4 TS-Anumāna for Oneself (Svārthānumāna) and Anumāna for others (Pararthānumāna) The Former Analysed

अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं च। तत्र स्वार्थं स्वानुमितिहेतुः। तथा हि स्वयमेव भूयो दर्शनेन यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति महानसादौ व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गतस्तद्गते चाग्नौ सन्दिहानः पर्वते धूमं पश्यन्व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति। तदनन्तरं वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्श इत्युच्यते। तस्मात् पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिरुत्पद्यते। तदेतत्स्वार्थानुमानम्।

यत्तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं पञ्चावयववाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत्परार्थानुमानम्। यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमवत्त्वात्। यो यो धूमवान्स वह्निमान् यथा महानसः। तथा चायम्। तस्मात्तथेति। अनेन प्रतिपादिताल्लिङ्गात्परोप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते।।

Inference is of two kinds - inference for oneself and inference for others.

Inference for oneself generates one's own inferential experience. For instance a person may comprehend the invariable relation between smoke and fire and arrive at the universal generalization - ' wherever there is smoke there is fire ' from his repeated observation in the kitchen and such other places and then approach a mountain. He may have doubt as to the presence of fire in that mountain. On seeing smoke there, he recollects the generalization (of the form) - ' wherever there is smoke there is fire '. Then, he comes to have the cognition ' This mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire '. It is this cognition that is called liṅgaparāmarśa '. From this cognition there arises the inferential cognition - ' The mountain has fire '. This is what is called inference for oneself.

Inference for others is the syllogistic expression which consists of five members and which a person employs after

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inferring for himself fire from smoke, with a view to enabling another person to have likewise, the same kind of inferential cognition. E.g. - ' The mountain has fire; because it has smoke; whichever has smoke has fire, as a kitchen; the mountain is such (has smoke which is invariably related to fire); and therefore it is such (has fire). From this five - membered syllogism, the other person to whom it is addressed comes to know the hetu (smoke) and infers fire from that.

TSD - MEANS OF COMPREHENDING VYĀPTI [VYĀPTIGRAHOPĀYA]

त. दी. - अनुमानं विभजते - **अनुमानमिति**। स्वार्थानुमितिं दर्शयति - **स्वयमेवेति**। **भूयोदर्शनेति**। धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तिग्रहे साध्यसाधनयोर्भूयः सहचारदर्शनिनेत्यर्थः। ननु पार्थिवत्वलोहलेख्यत्वादौ शतशः सहचारदर्शनिऽपि वज्रादौ व्यभिचारोपलब्धेर्भूयोदर्शनेन कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेन्न व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहसहकृतसहचारज्ञानस्य व्याप्तिग्राहकत्वात्। व्यभिचारज्ञानं द्विविधम् निश्चयः शङ्का च। तद्विरहः क्वचित्तर्कात्क्वचित्स्वतः सिद्ध एव। धूमाग्निव्याप्तिग्रहे कार्यकारणभावभङ्गप्रसङ्गलक्षणस्तर्को व्यभिचारशङ्कानिवर्तकः।। ननु सकलवह्निधूमयोरसंनिकर्षात्कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेन्न। धूमत्ववह्नित्वरूपसामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्या सकलधूमवह्निज्ञानसंभवात्।। **तस्मादिति**। लिङ्गपरामर्शादित्यर्थः। परार्थानुमानमाह - **यत्त्विति**।। यच्छब्दस्य तत्परार्थानुमानमिति तच्छब्देनान्वयः।। पञ्चावयवाक्यमुदाहरति - **यथेति**।।

The author subdivides 'anumāna' (in the words). Inference is of two ..... He describes 'inference for oneself' in the words 'one's own etc.,'. The term 'through repeated observation' is explained as follows : the invariable relation of smoke to fire has been repeatedly observed. It may be objected that even after experiencing a hundred times the association (sāhacarya) of the two features viz., earthness (pārthivatva) and liability to be scratched over with iron (loha - lekhyatva). Exception is found in the case of

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diamond etc., how can there be the ascertainment of vyāpti ? (The reply is :) no; for the knowledge of association (of two things) accompanied by the absence of any lack of correspondence (vyabhicāra) is what leads to the knowledge of vyāpti or regular concomitance. (vyabhicārajñānavirahasahakṛtasahacārajñānasya vyāptigrāhakatvāt). Knowledge of lack of correspondence may be of two kinds (i) certain (ii) doubtful. The absence of (vyabhicārajñāna) is brought about sometimes by tarka or indirect arguments; sometimes the absence is just self-evident (svataḥ-siddha) In regard to the knowledge of vyāpti as between smoke and fire, it is reductio ad absurdum (tarka) in the form of violation of the relation of effect-cause that serves to allay the doubt of any lack of correspondence. If it be objected that in the absence of a sense-presentation of all specimens of 'fire' and of 'smoke' how can there be the ascertainment of invariable concomitance or association (between them) ? (The reply is :) No. It is possible to have the knowledge of all instances of 'fire' and of smoke' through the operative relation (pratyāsatti) constituted by the common features (sāmānya) 'fireness' and 'smokeness'. The (TS term) 'from this' means from linga-parāmarśa.

6.5 TS - Analysis of Parārthānumāna; Five-Membered Syllogism (Pañcāvayava-vākya)

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि पञ्चावयवाः। पर्वतो वह्निमानिति **प्रतिज्ञा**। धूमवत्त्वादिति **हेतुः**। यो यो धूमवान्स सोऽग्निमान्यथा महानस **इत्युदाहरणम्**। तथा चायमित्युपनयः। तस्मात्तथेति **निगमनम्**।।

The five members of a syllogism are : (1) Proposition (or) the thesis set down (pratijñā), (2) the reason (hetu), (3)

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the statement consisting of illustrative example (udāharaṇa). (4) the subsumptive correlation (upanaya) and (5) conclusion (nigamana); 'The mountain has fire' is the proposition; because it has smoke - is the reason. "Whichever has smoke has fire as a kitchen" is the statement consisting of illustrative example; 'And so is this', this is the subsumptive correlation. Therefore it is such - this is the conclusion.

TSD-Definition and Function of each of the Five Avayavas

त. दी. - अवयवस्वरूपमाह - **प्रतिज्ञेति**। उदाहृतवाक्ये प्रतिज्ञादिविभागमाह - **पर्वतो वह्निमानिति**। साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा।। पञ्चम्यन्तं लिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वचनं हेतुः। व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकमुदाहरणम्। पक्षधर्मताज्ञानार्थमुपनयः। अबाधितत्वादिकं निगमनप्रयोजनम्।।

The author defines each limb of inference (avayava) by the words 'pratijñā etc.,'. The classification of pratijñā etc.. is known from the words 'The mountain has fire'. Pratijñā is a statement which conveys a pakṣa as possessed of the sādhya; hetu is that which conveys the ground of inference and which is in fifth case; udāharaṇa is the statement which lays down the vyāpti or the rule of association; upanaya is the statement which lays down the liṅga (ground) as qualified by the vyāpti; nigamana is the statement about the subject having the ground and the sādhya. The knowledge of the 'ground' (hetu) being free from the fault of bādhitatva etc., is the effect or purpose of (the statement called) nigamana.

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6.6 TS-Liṇga Parāmarśa-Karaṇa for both kinds of Anumiti

स्वार्थानुमिति परार्थानुमित्योः लिङ्गपरामर्श एव करणम्। तस्मात् लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम्।।

In the case of inferential cognition for oneself as well as that for others, it is the subsumptive reflection of the ground (liṇgaparāmarśa) that serves as the efficient and special cause (karaṇa). So liṇgaparāmarśa in this sense is the instrument of inferential cognition (anumāna).

TSD- (a) Need for Admitting Parāmarśa

(b) Definition of Karaṇa - refined.

(c) Liṇgajñāna or Liṇga-as the Karaṇa of Anumiti.

अनुमितिकरणम् आह - स्वार्थ इति। ननु व्याप्तिस्मृति - पक्ष धर्मताज्ञानाभ्यामेवानुमितिसंभवे व्याप्तिविशिष्टलिङ्गपरामर्शः किमर्थमङ्गीकर्तव्य इति चेन्न। वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति शाब्दपरामर्शस्थले विशिष्टपरामर्शस्यावश्यकतया लाघवेन सर्वत्र परामर्शस्यैव करणत्वात्। लिङ्गं न करणम्। अतीतादौ व्यभिचारात्। व्यापारवत्कारणं करणमिति मते परामर्शद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानं करणम्। तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः।। अनुमानमुपसंहरति - तस्मादिति।।

The author describes the karaṇa or the special condition for anumiti or inference-as-product in (the words) 'for inference for one's own self etc.,'

It might be objected that when it is possible to arrive at an inferential cognition even from the recollection of vyāpti and pakṣadharmatājñāna, why should a specific cognition (like parāmarśa) be postulated at all as a condition for inference. (the reply is :) (this objection cannot be admitted). As there is the necessity for (postulating a specific cognition like) parāmarśa in the case of a verbal parāmarśa like 'This (hill) has smoke which is an invariable associate of fire', it is parāmarśa alone that has got to be

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admitted for the sake of logical economy (lāghava), as a condition for all cases (of inferential cognition).

Liṇga (hetu) alone is not (to be regarded as) the specific cause (karaṇa) for the rise of an inferential cognition; for there is lack of correspondence in the case of a hetu relating to the past or future.

In the case of the view which considers the definition of karaṇa as "vyāpāravat kāraṇam" vyāptijñāna serves as karaṇa with parāmarśa as the intermediate vyāpāra. Vyāpāra means that factor which arises from an entity say (x) and also generates an effect (y) which is actually the effect of x.

The author concludes the section on anumāna with the words 'Therefore (liṇga-parāmarśa is anumāna).

Note : (1) A hetu which is actually present in the pakṣa is admitted to give rise to the knowledge of the sādhya in the pakṣa. But sometimes, we do infer the sādhya relating to past time and future on the basis of the knowledge of the liṇga (liṇgajñāna) as for instance, on seeing a sacrificial altar, we infer the existence of fire in the past time and future remembering the smoke related to past and future. (2) There is a divergence of view in the definition of karaṇa. The early school (prācīnā) of logicians define karaṇa or instrument as one that produces an effect through an intermediate cause (vyāpāra). It is a technical term and stands for 'that which being effected by a thing is a condition for the production of the effect of that thing. For example, the Mīmāṁsakas affirm that the performance of darśapūrnamāsa sacrifice results in heaven through the intermediate vyāpāra called apūrva. The latter arises from the performance of sacrifice, and also serves as a cause for

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the attainment of heaven that is actually the product of the sacrifice: Thus apūrva is the vyāpara and sacrifice is vyāpāravatkāraṇam. Hence it is known as karaṇa. Viewed in the light of this definition, vyāptijñāna is the karaṇa of anumiti by giving rise to parāmarśa, which is vyāpāra.

व्याप्तिज्ञानं ⟶ परामर्शः ⟶ अनुमितिः

(व्यापारवत्) (व्यापारः)

करणम्

व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्यत्वे सति व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्यानुमिति जनकत्वात् परामर्शो व्यापारः।

6.7 TS-Three Kinds of Liṇga Classified, Defined and Explained

लिङ्गं त्रिविधम्। अन्वयव्यतिरेकि केवलान्वयि केवलव्यतिरेकि चेति। अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकि। यथा वह्नौ साध्ये धूमवत्त्वम्। यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इत्यन्वयव्याप्तिः। यत्र वह्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महाह्रद इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः। अन्वयमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयि यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात्पटवत्। अत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वयोर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिर्नास्ति सर्वस्यापि प्रमेयत्वादभिधेयत्वाच्च। व्यतिरेकमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि यथा पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्धवत्त्वात्। यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत्। यथा जलम्। न चेयं तथा। तस्मान्न तथेति। यद्गन्धवत्तदितरभिन्नमित्यन्वयदृष्टान्तो नास्ति पृथिवीमात्रस्य पक्षत्वात्।।

Liṇga or (hetu) is of three kinds, (1) concomitant in affirmation and negation (anvayavyatireki), concomitant in affirmation alone (kevalānvayi) and concomitant in negation alone (kevalavyatireki). The anvayavyatireki type of hetu is that which has affirmative concomitance (anvayavyapti) and negative concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti) with the sādhya; as smoke when fire is the sādhya. 'Where there is smoke, there is fire as in a kitchen' - this is

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affirmative concomitance. 'Where there is no fire, there is no smoke as in a deep lake' - this is negative concomitance.

The kevalānvayi hetu has affirmative concomitance alone; as 'pot is nameable, because it is knowable, like a cloth'. In this instance, negative concomitance is impossible between knowability (prameyatva) and namability (abhidheyatva); for all things are knowable and namable.

The kevalavyatireki hetu has negative concomitance alone; as in the syllogism - 'Earth is different from the rest (not-earth) for it has smell; whichever is not different from the rest (not-earth) has no smell, as water; this earth is not so - i.e., it does not have absence of smell or gandhābhāva with which the absence of difference from not-earth (pṛthivītarabhedābhāva) is invariably concomitant vyāpaya; therefore, it is not so - i.e., it is not devoid of difference from not-earth'. In cases like this there is no example in which the affirmative relation 'whichever has smell, has difference from non-earth' may be made out; for all varieties of earth come under the pakṣa (subject of inference).

TSD - The Problem of 'Kevala-Vyatireki hetu'

त. दी. - लिङ्गं विभजते - **लिङ्गमिति**।। अन्वयव्यतिरेकि लक्षयति -**अन्वयेनेति**। हेतुसाध्ययोर्व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः। तदभावयोर्व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः।। केवलान्वयिनो लक्षणमाह - अन्वयेति। केवलान्वयिसाध्यकं केवलान्वयि। अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं केवलान्वयित्वम्। केवलान्वयिनमुदाहरति यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वादिति। ईश्वरप्रमाविषयत्वं सर्वपदाभिधेयत्वं च सर्वत्रास्तीति व्यतिरेकाभावः।। केवलव्यतिरेकिणो लक्षणमाह - **व्यतिरेकेति**। केवलव्यतिरेकिणमुदाहरति - **पृथवीति**। नन्वितरभेदः प्रसिद्धो वा न वा। आद्ये यत्र प्रसिद्धस्तत्र हेतुसत्त्वेऽन्वयित्वम् असत्त्वेऽसाधारण्यम्। द्वितीये

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साध्यज्ञानाभावात्कथं तद्विशिष्टानुमितिः। विशेषणज्ञानाभावे विशिष्टज्ञानानुदयात्। प्रतियोगिज्ञानाभावाद्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानमपि न स्यादिति चेन्न। जलादित्रयोदशान्योन्याभावानां त्रयोदशसु प्रत्येकं प्रसिद्धानां मेलनं पृथिव्यां साध्यते। तत्र त्रयोदशत्वावच्छिन्नभेदस्यैकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वाभावान्नान्वयित्वासाधारण्ये। प्रत्येकाधिकरणे प्रसिद्ध्या साध्यविशिष्टानुमितिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिनिरूपणं चेति।।

The author subdivides liṅga in the words 'The liṅga is ..... He defines (i) anvayavyatireki [liṅga] in [the words]' The anvayavyatireki type of hetu ..... Anvayavyapti is the invariable relation between the hetu and the sādhya ; vyatirekavyāpti is the relation that exists between sādhyābhāva and hetvabhāva. The author states the definition of kevalānvayi in the words 'The kevalānvayi hetu has ..... A hetu is called kevalānvayi if it proves a sādhya which is kevalānvayi. Kevalānvayitva consists in not being the counter - positive (pratiyogin) of its own absence. The author exemplifies kevalānvayi in the words ; 'The pot is nameable because it has the property of being knowable'. Since the property of 'being the object of God's knowledge' (Īśvara-pramā-viṣayatva) and the property of 'being the referent of a term' (sarvapadābhidheyatva) are present everywhere, there can be no absence (vyatireka) [of these entities]. The author states the definition of kevalavyatireki [in the words] 'That which has negative concomitance alone .....' He illustrates kevalavyatireki in [the words] 'Earth differs from .....'

It is now objected ; 'Difference from other things' - is it something known (prasiddha) or not? If the first alternative is held then in a substratum where "difference from other things" (itarabheda) exists, if the hetu exists

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then the anvayavyāpti is proved ; [and the hetu could no more be called kevalavyatireki ; if, however, the hetu does not exist in the substratum of sādhyādhikaraṇa then there would arise the fallacy of the hetu called asādhāraṇya. [This fallacy is explained in detail in the section on hetvābhāsa. Please refer to that section] Again, if we admit the second alternative, i.e., the sādhya is not prasiddha (elsewhere) or unknown, then it surely cannot function as a sādhya in an inferential cognition ; with an unknown sādhya there cannot surely be any inferential cognition having that sādhya for its adjective (viśeṣaṇa). For, the inferential cognition has for its cognition, a complex comprising a pakṣa, a sādhya and the relation between them (the **pakṣa** being the object as the **viśeṣya** and the **sādhya** being the object as the **prakāra**). In either case, then, the sādhya ' difference from other things ' fails to function as a sādhya in an inference with a hetu ' being endowed with smell '. If the sādhya is unknown, then its absence also would not be known. As a result, the vyatireka vyāpti involving reference to sādhyābhāva also cannot be explained. This is what is meant by pratiyogijñānābhāvāt ..... etc.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa replies by saying that the thirteen differences starting with 'difference from water' which are each known to be real (prasiddha) in the thirteen entities viz., the eight substances other than Earth, quality, action, universal, particularity and inherence the collection (melana) of these is predicated of Earth. Because of the absence of the sādhya as qualified by (the adjective)' thirteen' in any one thing or locus, there is neither anvayitva nor asādhāraṇya. Because of the knowledge

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(prasiddhi) of each of the [several] loci [of the several differences] there is [the possibility of] inferential cognition involving the sādhya and also [the possibility of] knowledge of vyāpti through knowledge of agreement in absence, which knowledge is of sādhya being the negatum of an absence which is the vyāpaka of the absence of the hetu.

Notes : It has been mentioned that it is impossible to have any vyatireka-vyāpti with difference from other things as a sādhya. Now this difficulty proceeds on the assumption that the relevant sādhya ' difference from other things ' is difference in general from other things and is thus something unitary. If such a unitary difference is a datum of experience, then one has to face the dilemma ; the difference either exists in at least one entity other than the inferential subject and then one has to face the dilemma ' either anvayitva or vyabhicāra ; or it does not, and then we have the impossibility of vyatireka-vyāpti with the sādhya under reference.

In the ' kevala - vyatireki ' inference ' Earth is different from other things, because it is endowed with smell ' what is predicated of Earth is not one unitary ' difference from other things ' but the collection of thirteen several differences viz., ' difference from water ' ' difference from tejas ' etc. Further, Annaṁbhaṭṭa speaks of thirteen differences existing in Earth, because according to the Vaiśeśika doctrine, positive reals (padārthas) comprise the substance group of nine and the non - substance group of five. These fourteen kinds of positive reals imply thirteen reciprocal differences with reference to any one of them as the seat (anuyogin) of these differences. In the present context, the substance ' Earth ' is the inferential subject

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and, therefore, the author of Dīpikā speaks of thirteen reciprocal differences abiding in Earth.

जलाद्यष्टभेदः गुणादिषड्भेदः अभावानङ्गीकर्तृवैशेषिकमते
चतुर्दशभेदः त्रयोदशभेद एव।
पृथिवी

6.8. TS-PAKṢA, SAPAKṢA AND VIPAKṢA-DEFINED AND ILLUSTRATED

(a) संदिग्धसाध्यवान्पक्षः। यथा धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ पर्वतः।।

(b) निश्चितसाध्यवान्सपक्षः। यथा तत्रैव महानसः।।

(c) निश्चितसाध्याभाववान्विपक्षः। यथा तत्रैव महाह्रदः।।

(a) Pakṣa (subject of inference) is that in which the presence of sādhya is not known for certain and is yet to be proved ; as a mountain, when smoke is relied upon as the hetu.

(b) Sapakṣa is a similar instance, in which the sādhya is known for certain; as a kitchen, in the same case of inference.

(c) Vipakṣa is a counter - example in which the non - existence of the sādhya is known for certain; as a deep lake, in the same case of inference.

Notes : When sapakṣa is defined as one where there is certainty of the sādhya, it does not mean the presence of the sādhya alone but also of the hetu. Likewise, vipakṣa is one where both sādhyābhāva and the hetvabhāva exist. In other words, sapakṣa and vipakṣa serve as illustrative examples to prove anvayavyāpti and vyatirekavyāpti respectively.

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TSD - THE DEFINITION OF PAKṢA EXAMINED

त.दी.-पक्षलक्षणमाह-संदिग्धेति। ननु श्रवणानन्तरभाविमनन-स्थलेऽव्याप्तिः। तत्र वेदवाक्यैरात्मनो निश्चितत्वेन संदेहाभावात्किंच प्रत्यक्षेऽपि वह्नौ यत्रेच्छयानुमितिस्तत्राप्यव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न। उक्तपक्षताश्रयत्वस्य पक्षलक्षणत्वात्।

त. दी. - सपक्षलक्षणमाह - निश्चितेति।।

त. दी. - विपक्षलक्षणमाहं - निश्चितेति।

.The author gives the definition of pakṣa in [the words] 'Pakṣa (subject of inference) is that in which .....'. It might be objected that in the case of reflection (manana) which follows (śravaṇa) hearing there is avyapti for the definition of pakṣa. Again, when there is the perception of fire, (in the mountain) if one desires to infer fire, the sdefinition of pakṣa is not applicable and hence there is avyāpti. The author states that ' being the substrate of (āśraya of) the Pakṣatā as stated above is the definition of pakṣa.

The author states the definition of sapakṣa in [the words]' that which is characterised by the certainty of the sādhya.

The author states the definition of vipakṣa in [the words]' that which is characterised by the uncertain sādhya.

Notes : In the definition of pakṣa, the first avyāpti is explained as follows. According to a Vaidika dictum 'The self is to be realised ; heard ; reflected and meditated upon; three steps are prescribed as a means of realising the self. (i) śravaṇa or hearing from the qualified preceptor that the self is the subject of consciousness and is other than the psycho-physicalorganism. (ii) manana or reflecting on the

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truth revealed through śravaṇa (iii) nididhyāsana on constantly meditating on that truth. Now, the second of the above three stages, viz., reflection is nothing but the mental act of inferring. But since, the vaidika dictum imparted by the preceptor to the aspirant is accepted an infallible by him, the latter gets a firm conviction about its truth at the very first stage of śravaṇa. He is thus precluded from 'reflecting' on that truth. 'Reflection' as has just been said is inferring ; in the present context it is inferring the existence or nature of Self or God. This means that Self or God will have to figure as the pakṣa or subject of that inference. But by Annaṁbhaṭṭa's definition, an entity can be a pakṣa only when it is characterized by an uncertain sādhya. Thus the definition of pakṣa does not cover the case of Self or God and hence it is open to the defect of avyāpti.

The second avyāpti is explained as follows : A person for instance perceives fire in a mountain and is quite assured of its presence. He may nevertheless seek to infer the presence of fire in the mountain on the strength of his perception of smoke coming out of that montain. The form of the inference would be as follows : 'The mountain has fire in it, for there is smoke coming out of it'. The inference would be quite correct. And in that inference 'mountain' would figure as the subject and fire as the sādhya. But since the person inferring already has the knowledge of fire in the mountain it is a case where the subject of inference has an assured sādhya. The Tarkasaṅgraha definition of pakṣa cannot thus cover the pakṣa of this valid inference ; for according to the definition, something can claim to be a

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'pakṣa' of an inference only if it has an uncertain or unassured sādhya.

To overcome this difficulty Annaṁbhaṭṭa replaces his TS definition of pakṣa as the substrate or seat of pakṣatā (pakṣataśrayaḥ pakṣaḥ) Pakṣatā has already been explained in the present unit earlier.

6.9 LET US SUM UP

As Vātsyāyana puts it, pratyakṣa is equivalent to anvīkṣā; and the Nyāya system is called ānvīkṣikī, for the reason that its immediate and chief aim is to elucidate the nature of anumāna or anvīkṣā as **apramāṇa**. In the case of every pramāṇa the karaṇa (special instrument), the vyāpāra (intermediate cause and the phala (final result) should be carefully, distinguished. In the case of anumāna (instrument of inferential experience) the knowledge of co-presence (vyāptijñāna) is karaṇa ; subsumptive reflection (parāmarśa) is vyāpāra; and inferential experience (anumiti) is phala. In order to understand anumāna in its entirety, we have explained in this unit all the technical terms such as pakṣa, sādhya, hetu or sādhana, vyāpti, parāmarśa. Unless one has a clear conception of the meanings of the technical terms it is not possible to understand the nyāya system and the epistemology of any Indian Philosophical systems. Hence the students are expected to take utmost case in reading this unit. The following unit takes up the fallacies of the hetu which is much more technical. Hence please ensure yourself about the clarity of the concepts in the present unit. The next unit is only application of these concepts.

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6.10 SELF CHECK QUESTIONS

(1) Define anvaya vyāpti and vyatireka vyāpti.

(2) What are the constituents of an inferential cognition ?

(3) Define Paramarśa.

(4) Consider the vyāpya vyāpakabhāva relation between smoke and fire.

(5) Define vyāpti.

(6) What are the two definitions of pakṣatā ?

(7) What is Pakṣadharmatā ?

(8) What are the two types of anumiti ?

(9) What are the means of comprehending vyāpti ?

(10) What are the five members of syllogism ? How do they help the rise of Parārthānumāna ?

(11) What are the three kinds of liṅgas - Explain with examples.

(12) What is the uniqueness of kevalānvayi and kevalavyatireki hetus ?

(13) Define pakṣa, sapakṣa and vipakṣa.

6.11 KEYWORDS

(1) Hetu (2) Sādhya (3) Vyāpya (4) Vyāpaka (5) Pakṣa (6) Pakṣatā (7) Pakṣadharmata (8) anvayavyāpti (9) Vyatirekavyāpti (10) Svārthānumāna (11) Parārthānumāna (12) Liṅgas (13) Pañcāvayava (14) Parāmarśa (15) Vyāptijñana (16) Sapakṣa (17) Vipakṣa (18) Karaṇa

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NOTES

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UNIT-7
Fallacies of the Hetu & Upamāna Pramāṇa

STRUCTURE

7.0 Objectives

7.1 TS - Five kinds of hetvābhāsa (defective hetu) enumerated

TSD - Hetvābhāsa - hetudoṣa defined

7.2 TS - Savyabhicāra and its three varieties defined and illustrated

7.3 TS - Viruddha defined and illustrated

7.4 TS - Satpratipakṣa defined and illustrated

7.5 TS - Three kinds of Asiddha enumerated

(i) Āśrayāsiddhi and (ii) Svarūpāsiddhi illustrated.

(iii) Vyāpyatvasiddhi defined as sopādhika hetu & illustrated. Upādhi - defined and illustrated.

TSD - Four kinds of 'Upādhi' enumerated and illustrated.

7.6 TS Bādhita - Defined and illustrated

7.7 TSD - A Resume of Hetvābhāsas

Upamāna as a pramāṇa defined and analysed

7.8 Let us sum up

7.9 Self check questions

7.10 Key words

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UNIT-7
Fallacies of the Hetu & Upamāna Pramāṇa

7.0 OBJECTIVES

In the previous unit you were introduced to the three types of hetu which contribute to the rise of valid inferential cognition. The constitutions of inference such as pakṣa, sapakṣa etc., were also explained in detail. It is essential to know that each one of these constituents, plays an important role in effecting a valid inferential cognition. A hetu for eg., is always expressed in fifth case. But all that is expressed in fifth case is not a hetu. At best they may bear the semblance of a hetu. It is for this reason they are designated hetvābhāsas. It is a fallacious reason or defective reason Gautama definitely classifies defective reasons under five heads and uses the significant expression 'hetvābhāsā' which literally means 'a semblance of reason' or what appears to be a reason while it is really not such'. The true function of a hetu is to prove a sādhya. The defects which vitiate a hetu are called hetudoṣāḥ. A hetu which is associated with a defect is called hetvābhāsā. The chief role of a hetvābhāsa is to counteract the rise of anumiti or its instrument, viz., vyāptijñāna or parāmars'a or its constituent viz., pakṣadharmatā.

The five hetvābhāsas with their sub - divisions would no doubt appear difficult with their hair - split differences, yet, with little more concentration, one is sure to comprehend it with clarity. We shall now explain the five kinds of hetvābhāsās.

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7.1 TS-Five Kinds of Hetvābhāsa [Defective hetu] Enumerated

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षासिद्धबाधिताः पञ्च हेत्वाभासाः।।

त. दी. एवं सद्धेतुं निरूप्यासद्धेतुं निरूपयितुं विभजते - **सव्यभिचारेति**। अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकयथार्थज्ञानविषयत्वं हेत्वाभासत्वम्।

TS - Fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsaḥ = literally semblances of reason) are of five kinds -viz., savyabhicāra, viruddha satpratipakṣa, asiddha and bādhita.

Hetvābhāsa - hetudoṣa defined :

TSD - Having thus explained the nature of the valid hetu-s (sad hetus) [of an inference] in order to ascertain the nature of fallacious reasons (asad hetus) the author sub - divides the latter in the words ' Savyabhicāra ..... etc. To be the object of a correct knowledge that would conteract the rise of anumiti constitutes hetvābhāsa.

Notes : The expression hetvābhāsa is a compound consisting of the two terms 'hetu' and 'ābhāsa'. Hetu in the present context means the ground of an inference, and 'ābhāsa' means either an appearance or defect. The compound expression hetvābhāsa, therefore, signifies an apparent ground of inference. hetuvadābhāsanta iti hetvābhāsāḥ - duṣṭahetavaḥ or the defect of a ground under consideration hetoḥ ābhāsaḥ - hetudoṣāḥ. It may be noted that while Annambhaṭṭa in his Tarkasaṅgraha uses the term hetvābhāsa to signify a defective hetu, in his Dipikā he uses the term to denote the defect of a hetu. A hetvābhāsa ultimately conteracts the rise of anumiti or its instrument viz., vyāptijñāna or parāmarśa.

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7.2 TS-Savyabhicāra and its three varieties defined and illustrated

सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः। स त्रिविधः। साधरणासाधारणानुपसंहारिभेदात्। तत्र साध्याभाववदवृत्तिः साधारणोऽनैकान्तिकः। यथा पर्वतो वह्निमन्प्रमेयत्वादिति प्रमेयत्वस्य वह्न्यभाववति ह्रदे विद्यमानत्वात्। सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तोऽसाधारणः। यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वादिति। शब्दत्वं सर्वेभ्यो नित्येभ्योऽनित्येभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तं शब्दमात्रवृत्ति। अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तरहितोऽनुपसंहारी। यथा सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति। अत्र सर्वस्यापि पक्षत्वाद्दृष्टान्तो नास्ति।

Savyabhicāra is otherwise known as anaikāntika. It is of three kinds viz., common (sādhāraṇa) uncommon (asādhāraṇa) and non - conclusive (anupasaṁhārin). Sādhāraṇa is that variety of reason which is present in a place where the sādhya is not present as in the inferential argument - "The mountain has fire, because it is knowable". In this argument knowability is found in a deep lake where fire is not present.

The uncommon (asādhāraṇa) is that reason which is present only in the subject of inference (pakṣa) and not present in any similar instance (sapakṣa) or counter - example (vipakṣa), as soundness (śabdatva), in the argument - 'Sound is eternal, because it is sound", Śabdatva (soundness) is present only in sound, and no where else, both eternal and non - eternal.

The non - conclusive hetu (anupasaṁhārin) is that reason which has no affirmative or negative example (anvayadṛṣṭānta or vyatirekadṛṣṭānta) like knowability (prameyatva) in the inferential argument - ' All objects are non - eternal because they are knowable '. Here no illustrative example is available as all objects are included under pakṣa.

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त. दी. सव्यभिचारं विभजते - **स त्रिविध इति**। साधारणं लक्षयति - **तत्रेति**। उदाहरति - **यथेति**। असाधारणं लक्षयति - सर्वेति। अनुपसंहारिणो लक्षणमाह - **अन्वयेति**।।

TSD - The author sub - divides (savyabhicāra) in [the words]' It is of three kinds. He defines sādhāraṇa in [the words]. Of these*..... 'He illustrates it in [the words]. As for example .....'. He illustrates a-sādhāraṇa in [the words]. That which is absent ..... 'He states the definition of anupasaṃhārin in [the words] The hetu which is devoid of ..... '

Notes : Annaṁbhaṭṭa defined the first variety savyabhicāra as anaikāntika. The term savyabhicāra is a compound signifying ' that which is associated with vyabhicāra. As it is adjective of the term hetu the term savyabhicāra means the hetu that is characterised by vyabhicāra. Vyabhicāra means inconstancy. The savyabhicāra hetu is one that is characterised by inconstancy or irregularity in its relation to a sādhya. That is, it is an inconstant hetu. It does not have a constant association with the sādhya, and, therefore, it does not conform to the condition expressed by the principle, 'wherever the hetu exists the sādhya also would exist'. The term anaikāntika also means the inconstant hetu. It is a compound which signifies that which is not aikāntika. The latter - comes from ekānta meaning rule or regularity (niyama). Anaikāntika thus means the hetu which is characterised by irregularity in its relation to the sādhya. Thus it is interchangeable with savyabhicāra.

As an example of the first variety of savyabhicāra Annaṃbhaṭṭa cites the examples 'The hill has fire because it has knowability' wherein, fire is the sādhya and

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knowability is the hetu. The inference is fallacious because the hetu is a faulty one; because the relation of the hetu to the sādhya is not constant. That is, although the hetu, knowability is present where the sādhya, fire is present, it is also present where there is the absence of fire (sādhyābhāva). In other words the proposition like 'wherever there is knowability there is fire is not true. Without the help of such a proposition it is not possible to have any correct inference.

Asādhāraṇa has been defined by the author as the hetu being absent in every sapakṣa and in every vipakṣa and is present only in the pakṣa. As an example of such a hetu, the author cites the case of sound-ness in the context of an inference like 'sound is eternal, because it has sound-ness'. Here sound is the subject (pakṣa), eternity is the sādhya and soundness is the hetu. The inference is fallacious, because the 'hetu' here is a faulty one. The hetu is faulty because there is not any established instance of the co-presence of the hetu and the sādhya. Eternity is present in eternal things like atoms, ākāśa, dik, kāla and manas but soundness is not present in these things. Nor is the hetu, sound-ness present in any non-eternal things like pot etc., which constitute the vipakṣa here. It is present only in sound which is the pakṣa here. It is called asādhāraṇa hetu because it is the exact opposite of the sādhāraṇa hetu. While the former is present neither in a sapakṣa, nor in a vipakṣa, the latter is present both in sapakṣa as well as in a vipakṣa.

Anupasaṁhārin type of savyabhicāra has been defined by Annaṁbhaṭṭa as a hetu which is devoid of any supporting instance, positive or negative. As an example of

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this type of hetu, the author cites the example of prameyatva (knowability) in the context of an inference like 'Every thing is non-eternal, because it is knowable'. Here 'everything' is the subject of inference (pakṣa); non-eternity is the sādhya and knowability is the ground of inference (hetu). In order to prove the positive (anvaya) form of vyāpti, and the negative (vyatireka) form of vyāpti between knowability and non-eternity, we need places where these vyāpti could be ascertained. As mentioned earlier they are known as sapakṣa and vipakṣa respectively. These two are necessarily different from the pakṣa where there is doubt regarding the sādhya prior to the rise of anumiti. Now by the word "everything" we mean to include all objects under pakṣa. Thus, nothing remains to be treated as sapakṣa or vipakṣa. Hence the hetu although is involved in the universal proposition, yet, this cannot be asserted for want of supporting instances. It is called 'anupasaṁhārin', because such a hetu does not enable us to have an upasaṁhāra or conclusive assessment of the actual relation obtaining between the relevant hetu and the sādhya.

7.3 TS - Viruddha defined and illustrated

TS - साध्याभावव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः। यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वादिति। कृतकत्वं हि नित्यत्वाभावेनानित्यत्वेन व्याप्तम्।।

TSD - विरुद्धं लक्षयति - साध्येति।।

Viruddha (adverse reason) is one which is invariably concomitant with the non-existence of the sādhya; as producibility (kṛtakatva), in the argument - 'sound is eternal, because it is produced'. Here producibility is invariably concomitant with non-eternity, which amounts to the non-existence of eternity.

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TSD - The author defines (the adverse reason) 'Viruddha' in (the words) the adverse reason is one .....'

Notes : For the adverse reason, the author cites the case of "being an effect" (kṛtakatva) in the context of an inference like 'Sound is eternal, because it has the state of being an effect'. In this inference, sound is the subject of inference. eternity is the sādhya and the state of being an effect is the hetu. The hetu is defective because it does not establish the sādhya but the absence of it. Instead of being a regular associate with the sādhya, it the hetu is present with the absence of sādhya (sādhyābhāva). This variety of defective hetu counter - acts the rise of an inference by preventing the rise of the knowledge of invariable relation.

7.4 TS-Satpratipakṣa-defined and illustrated

यस्य साध्यभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स **सत्प्रतिपक्षः**।

यथा शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वाच्छब्दत्ववदिति। शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वाद्घटवदिति।।

त. दी. सत्प्रतिपक्षं लक्षयति - **यस्येति**।।

The opposable reason (satpratipakṣa) is one which admits of being counter - balanced by another reason that proves non - existence of the sādhya ; as audibility in the argument - " Sound is eternal, because it is audible, like soundness " (śabdatva). The counter - reason in this case is producibility (kāryatva) in the counter - argument- "Sound is non - eternal, because it is produced"

TSD - The author defines satpratipakṣa [in the words] The opposable reason .....

Notes : For this kind of defective hetu, audibility is

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cited in the context of the inference 'Sound is eternal, because it has audibility'. In this inference, 'sound is the subject of inference (pakṣa), eternity is the sādhya and audibility is the hetu. The invariable relation ' wherever there is audibility, there is eternity ' e.g. soundness is not correct in the sense that this relation could be proved only in the subject of inference and not elsewhere. Another inference of the form ' Sound is non - eternal ' because it has an effect - character '. This inference also is defective. The hetu here is defective not by itself, but because there is another hetu ' audibility ' to prove an opposite sādhya, viz., eternity. As a result either inference is rendered inconclusive. This follows from the fact that though each of the two inferences is based on the knowledge of its own rule of invariable relation, yet because they lead to contradictory conclusions, neither succeeds leading to a sure conclusion.

same pakṣa { शब्दः नित्यः श्रावणत्वात् शब्दत्ववत्
↓
its absence proved by another hetu
↓
शब्दः अनित्यः कार्यत्वात्

Here the first hetu becomes satpratipakṣita. However, if the second inferential statement is uttered first and then the first then kāryatva becomes satpratipakṣita.

To give another example :

The Advaitins consider the world to be unreal or mithyā on the grounds that it is given in perception ; insentient etc.

The inferential argument is :

जगत् मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात्, जडत्वात्

The Dvaitins who proclaim the world to be real

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immediately give a counter - argument to prove reality in the same pakṣa viz., the world by a different hetu, namely adaptability to practical needs of life (arthakriyākāritva). It is thus :

जगत् सत्यं अर्थक्रियाकारित्वात्. Here the first hetu becomes satpratipakṣita. If, however, this order is interchanged then the latter hetu comes first and becomes satpratipakṣta.

7.5 TS-Three kinds of Asiddha enumerated

असिद्धिस्त्रिविधः। आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धश्चेति। आश्रयासिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभ्यरविन्दत्वात्सरोजारविन्दवत्। अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः। स च नास्त्येव। स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा शब्दो गुणश्चक्षुषत्वात्। अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं शब्दे नास्ति शब्दस्य श्रावणत्वात्। सोपाधिकोव्याप्यत्वासिद्धः। साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिः। साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं साध्यव्यापकत्वम्। साधनवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वम्। पर्वतो धूमवान्वाह्निमत्वादित्यत्रार्देन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः। तथाहि। यत्र धूमस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग इति साध्यव्यापकता। यंत्र वह्निस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोगो नास्त्ययोगोलक आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगाभावादिति साधनाव्यापकता। एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वादार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः। सोपाधिकत्वाद्वह्निमत्वं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धम्।।

Asiddha (unestablished reason) is of three kinds: viz., unestablished in respect of abode (āśrayāsiddha), unestablished in respect of itslef (svarūpāsiddha) and unestablished in respect of its concomitance (vyapyatvāsiddha).

That hetu is āśrayāsiddha, for which the locus does not exist. For example, in the argument - ' Sky lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like the lotus of a pond. Here sky - lotus is the locus or subject of inference and it does not exist (1).

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The hetu is svarūpāsiddha when it does not exist in the subject of inference (2).

In the argument - 'Sound is a quality, because it is visible, like colour, visibility cannot be predicated of sound (the pakṣa) as it is only audible.

The hetu is said to be vyapyatvāsiddha when it is associated with an adventitious condition (upādhi). That is said to be an adventitious condition which is co - existent with the sādhya and not pervasive with the sādhana or the hetu. (The former is referred to as sādhyavyāpakatva and the latter is known as sādhana avyāpakatva). Sādhyavyāpakatva consists in a feature not becoming the counter - positive (pratiyogi) of an abhāva which exists in the substratum of sādhya. Sādhana avyāpakatva means that a feature becomes the counter - positive (pratiyogi) of an abhāva which exists in the substratum of the sādhana (3).

In the argument - " The mountain has smoke, because it has fire " contact with wet fuel (ārdrendhana saṁyoga) is the adventitious condition. It is thus : "wherever there is smoke there is contact with wet fuel" - thus it is pervasive of the sādhya. There is no contact with wet fuel in every place where there is fire ; for instance, a ret - hot iron ball has no contact with wet fuel ; thus the upadhi is non - pervasive of the sādhana. Thus the 'contact with wet fuel' is the upādhi in the present instance because it is pervasive of the sādhya and non - pervasive of the sādhana. In the argument under reference fire is vyāpyatvāsiddha, since it is associated with an adventitious condition (4).

Notes :

(1) Logically speaking, to say an object ' A ' does not

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exist in a particular place, presupposes its existence elsewhere. However, when the Naiyāyikas say that sky - lotus which is the pakṣa does not exist he means it as an absolute nothing. That is, the state of springing up from the sky does not exist in the lotus. This is what is meant by the sentence "The sky - lotus does not exist". It is similar to saying the state of being associated with Hare does not exist in the horns. It is otherwise known as pakṣāprasiddha.

(2) The knowledge of the presence of the hetu in the pakṣa is one of the five criteria of a valid hetu which contributes to the rise of a valid inferential cognition. The other conditions are (1) presence of the hetu in the sapakṣa; its non - presence in the vipakṣa ; that it is not defective - satpratipakṣa hetu ; that it is not a defective - bādhita hetu.

(3) साध्य व्यापकत्व can be diagrammatically shown as follows :

In the example : पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्नेः, आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is the उपाधि। Here धूम is the sādhya, वह्नि is the hetu. The उपाधि is साध्य व्यापक means

साध्य (धूम) → महानसः → न तु आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगाभावः
अधिकरण

किन्तु गोत्वाद्याभावः तत्प्रतियोगित्वं-गोत्वे
अप्रतियोगित्वम्-आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे
इति साध्यव्यापकत्वम्

यस्य अभाव सः प्रतियोगि
घटस्य अभावः चेत् घटः प्रतियोगि
अतः साध्य (धूम) व्यापकत्वं आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे
साधनाव्यापकत्व is as follows :

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In the example given साधन or हेतु is वह्नि !

साधनाव्यापकत्व means साधनवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम्।

साधन (वह्निः) → अयोगोलकम् → आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगाभावः

तत्प्रतियोगित्वं आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे इति साधनाव्यापकत्वम्

वह्नि is a व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेतु, i.e., it does not become व्याप्य to धूम, because it is associated with उपाधि.

To be explicit : Let us consider धूम as A, वह्नि as B and उपाधि as C. Now, A co-exists with C. B does not co-exist with C. This means that B does not co-exist with A too which co-exists with C.

TSD - Four kinds of Upādhi - Enumerated and Illustrated

त. दी. - असिद्धं विभजते - असिद्ध इति।। आश्रयासिद्धमुदाहरति - गगनेति।। स्वरूपासिद्धमुदाहरति - शब्देति।। व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्य लक्षणंमाह - सोपाधिक इति। उपाधिलक्षणमाह - साध्येति। उपाधिश्चतुर्विधः। केवलसाध्यव्यापकः पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः उदासीनधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकश्चेति। आद्य आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः। द्वितीयो यथा - वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वादित्यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वव्यापकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम्। तृतीयो यथा - प्रध्वंसो विनाशी जन्यत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम्। चुतर्थो यथा - प्रागभावो विनाशी प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम्।

The author sub - divides 'asiddha' in [the words] 'asiddha is of three kinds ..... The author illustrates' āśrayāsiddha 'in [the words]' The sky - lotus ..... He illustrates 'svarūpādiddha' in the words ' Sound is ..... The author gives the definition of vyapyatvāsiddha in [the words] the hetu is said to be ..... He gives the definition of upādhi in [the words] ' That is said to be adventitious

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condition..... An adventitions conditions (Upādhi) is of four kinds : (i) that which is vyāpaka of the sādhya 'by itself' without being qualified hence it known as kevalasādhyavyāpaka (ii) that which is vyāpaka of the sādhya as qualified by a feature of the subject of inference (pakṣa) hence it is called pakṣadharmāvacchinna - sādhyavyāpaka (iii) that which is vyāpaka of the sādhya ' as qualified by a feature of the sādhana and it is known as sādhanāvacchinna sādhyavyāpaka ; and (iv) that which is vyāpaka of the sādhya as qualified by an unknown feature i.e. that feature which does not pertain either to the pakṣa or the sādhana; hence it is designated udāsīnadharmāvacchinna sādhyavyāpaka. The first is exemplified by 'association with wet fuel' ; the second by 'the fact of having a manifest colour' (udbhutarūpavatuvam) which is the vyāpaka of perceptibility as qualified by the state of being an external substance (bahirdravyatva) in the case of [an inference like] ' Air is perceptible, because it is the substrate of perceptible thermal quality ' ; the third by 'the state of being a positive entity' (bhāvatva) which is the ' vyāpaka ' of destructibility as qualified by the state of being an effect (janyatvāvacchinnānityatva) in the case of [an inference like] ' Destruction is destructible, because it is an effect ; the fourth by 'the state of being a positive entity' which is the vyāpaka of destructibility as qualified by the state of being an effect in the case of [an inference like] 'Prior non - existence is destructible, because it is something that is knowable '.

Notes :

(i) In Tarkasaṇgraha, Annaṃbhaṭṭa illustates only one kind of upādhi but in the Dīpika he exemplifies four varieties according to the four

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different ways in which a Sādhya may figure when an upādhi may become the vyāpaka of a sādhya. In the inference 'The hill has smoke because it has fire in it' the hetu fire has the adventitious condition 'association with wet fuel'. It becomes the sādhya vyāpaka as 'यत्र यत्र धूमः तत्र आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः' by itself without any qualification related to the sādhya, viz., smoke. This kind of upādhi is known as kevala-sādhya-vyāpaka.

(ii) For the second variety known as pakṣadharmāvacchinnasādhyavyāpaka see notes under the section वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वात् इत्यत्र उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम् उपाधिः। of the present text in the section on वायुः.

(iii) Sādhanāvacchinnasādhyavyāpaka is exemplified by the hetu of the following inference : 'Destruction is destructible because it is originated'. Here the relevant rule of invariable relation would have to be like 'whatever is originated is destructible'. But this proposition cannot be accepted unconditionally. What can be accepted without qualification is 'whichever positive entity is originated is destructible'. So being a positive entity (bhāvatva) is the adventitious condition here. It is an upādhi for it is vyāpaka of the sādhya thus :

Wherever there is destructibility of something that originates; there is the state of being a positive entity.

It is also avyāpaka of the hetu. The proposition 'wherever there is the state of being originated,

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there is also the state of being a positive entity is not true for dhvaṁsa or destruction is originated, without being a positive entity. Now, this condition 'being a positive entity is the vyāpaka of the sādhya, 'destructibility' not as unqualified but only as characterized by the hetu, 'being something that is originated'. Being a positive entity (bhāvatva) is thus a vitiating condition of a new kind known as sādhanāvacchinnasādhya-vyāpaka. In the Dipikā, there are two different readings in regard to the pakṣa of the inference under discussion. In Nilakaṇṭha's Prakāśika and in the present edition of TSD it is given as prior non-existence, whereas in pada-kṛtyam another commentary on TS, it is given as destruction (dhvaṁsa). We have here adopted the latter reading as it is easy to elucidate.

(iv) The fourth kind of upādhi is designated as udāsīna dharmāvacchinna-sādhya-vyāpaka. By udāsīnadharma is meant a feature other than what is found either in the pakṣa or in the sādhana. It is exemplified by the hetu of the following inference:

'Prior non-existence (prāgabhāva) is destructible because it has the character of being knowable'.

The rule of invariable relation here may have to be like 'whatever is knowable is destructible'. But this proposition cannot be accepted without qualification for there are knowable objects like ākāśā, kāla and dik etc., which are not destructible. What could be asserted unconditionally is 'whatever knowable that is originated

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and is positive it is destructible'. So here a 'positive originated entity' is the condition. It is an upādhi because it is vyāpaka of the sādhya, 'destructibility'. We thus say : wherever there is destructibility of an originated entity, there is the state of being a positive knowable' It is also avyāpaka of the hetu, knowability, for it would not be true to say 'wherever there is knowability there is the state of being a positive entity'. Thus 'being an originated positive entity' (janyatvāvacchinna anityatva vyāpaka bhāvatvam) which is a feature neither present in the pakṣa nor in the hetu. It is thus udāsinadharmāvacchinna-sādhya-vyāpaka.

7.6 Bādhita - Defined and Illustrated

TS - यस्य साध्याभावः प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स बाधितः। यथा वह्निरनुष्णो द्रव्यत्वादिति। अत्रानुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उष्णत्वं स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति बाधितत्त्वम्।।

The stultified reason (bādhita) is one which is put forward to prove a sādhya whose non - existence is established by another proof. 'Fire is not hot, because it is a substance', the sādhya is 'not being hot; its reverse - 'being hot' is perceived through tactile perception; so, the sādhya is stultified or sublated (bādhita).

TSD - A Resume of Hetvābhāsās

त. दी. - बाधितस्य लक्षणमाह - **यस्येति**। अत्र बाधस्य ग्राह्याभावनिश्चयत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य विरोधिज्ञानसामग्रीत्वेन साक्षादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वम्। इतरेषां तु परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकत्वम्। तत्रापि साधारणस्याव्यभिचाराभावतया विरुद्धस्य सामानाधिकरण्या भावतया व्यापकत्वासिद्धस्य विशिष्टव्याप्त्यभावतया असाधारणानुपसंहारिणोर्व्याप्तिसंशयाधायकत्वेन च व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम्। आश्रयासिद्धस्वरूपा-

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सिद्धयोः पक्षधर्मताज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम्। उपाधिस्तु व्यभिचारज्ञानद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकः। सिद्धसाधनं तु पक्षताविघट(क?)तया आश्रयासिद्धेऽन्तर्भवतीति प्राञ्चः। निग्रहस्थानान्तरमिति नवीनाः।

Of these five varieties of defective hetus, bādha or sublation as certain knowledge of the absence (of the sādhya in the subject of inference) and sat-pratipakṣa as the cause of the knowledge of the opposite (thesis) directly counteract the rise of inferential cognition. The others counteract by impeding (the rise of) parāmarśa. Again, of them, sādhāraṇa as embodying the absence of the absence of inconstancy or vyabhicāra (avyabhicārābhāva-vattayā) 'viruddha' as embodying the absence of co-existence (sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāva), vyāpyātvāsiddha as embodying the absence of a specific rule of invariable relation, asādhāraṇa and anupasaṁhārin as giving rise to the uncertainty or doubt regarding the rule of invariable relation, counter-act the rise of the knowledge of invariable relation. Āśrayāsiddha and svarūpāsiddha counteract the rise of the pakṣadharmatājñāna. Upādhi, acts through the knowledge of inconstancy or vyabhicāra as an impediment to the knowledge of invariable relation (vyāptijñāna). Siddhasādhana, however, comes under āśrayāsiddha as counteracting the knowledge of pakṣatā according to the early school of logicians; it is a new kind of nigrahasthāna according to the the new logicians.

A person seeking to establish anew what is admittedly established does surely something uncalled for and in so far he exhibits for the time being a sort of feeble-mindedness. But any such exhibition would be a point of discredit to anyone engaging in an argument with an opponent. Such a point of discredit is known as nigraha-sthāna.

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Notes : In the Tarkasaṅgraha Annambhaṭṭa has not given the definition of hetvābhāsa. In the Dīpikā he offers indeed one to the effect that a hetvābhāsa is a defective hetu that may counteract the rise of correct inferential cognition either directly or indirectly by interfering with the special condition of such cognition. Of the five hetvābhāsas listed, bādha and satpratipakṣa directly counteract the rise of anumiti. The others counteract the karaṇa of anumiti viz., either vyāptijñāna or parāmarśa or even the constituents of paramarśa viz., pakṣadharamatājñāna, pakṣata etc.,

7.7 Upamāna as a Pramāṇa Defined and Analysed

TS - उपमितिकरणमुपमानम्। संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धज्ञानमुपमितिः। तत्करणं सादृश्यज्ञानम्। अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तरव्यापारः। तथा हि कश्चिद्गवयशब्दार्थमजानन्कुतश्चिदारण्यकपुरुषाद्गोसदृशो गवय इति श्रुत्वा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन्गोसदृशं पिण्डं पश्यति। तदनन्तरमसौ गवयशब्दवाच्य इत्युपमितिरुत्पद्यते।।

TSD - उपमानं लक्षयति - उपमितीति।।

Analogy (upamāna) is the instrument of assimilative cognition (upamiti). Assimilative cognition consists in the knowledge of the significative relation between a word and the object denoted by it. Knowledge of similarity is the instrument (karaṇa) of such cognition. This may be illustrated thus : A person is ignorant of the exact meaning of the word gavaya (a wild animal of the bovine species). He learns from a forester, that a gavaya is similar to cow. Later when he happens to go to a forest and see the animal called gavaya, which is similar to a cow, he recollects the instruction conveyed by the assimilative

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proposition (atidesavākya). Then the assimilative cognition 'This is the animal denoted by the word gavaya" arises.

TSD - The author defines Upamāna in (the words) 'Analogy is the instrument ..... so much for upamāna.

Notes : The conception of Upamāna as a distinct instrument of valid cognition restricts its scope to the ascertainment of the significative relation of a word to its sense. (śaktigraha). This kind of restricting its scope by the Naiyāyikas is to avoid it being included under inference (anumāna).

Of the several means of comprehending the power present in a word to convey a meaning, upamāna is one means.

Upamāna Upamiti

(गोसदृशो गवयः) ⟶ (गवयः गवयशब्दवाच्यः)

According to the Mīmāṁsakas, the cognition embodied in the proposition 'The animal called gavaya is similar to a cow' is the efficient instrumental cause and the cognition "My cow is similar to this animal called gavaya" is the resultant (upamiti) cognition; whereas according to the Naiyāyikas the resultant cognition (upamiti) is in the form of the knowledge of the primary significative power of the word gavaya (gavayapada śaktigraha). It could be noted that the relation between the karaṇa and the phala (result) according to the Mīmāṁsakas, is exactly similar to the relation between the two propositions 'A is similar to B' and 'B is similar to A'. The Naiyāyikas, however, do not face this difficult position. It is by assigning a very important role of giving rise to śabdaśakti that upamāna is treated as a distinct pramāṇa by the Naiyāyikas.

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7.8 Let Us Sum Up

In the process of illustrating the sadhetus the author has felt the need for defining and illustrating asad-hetus (defective grounds) which counteract the rise of anumiti or its instrument, viz., vyāptijñāna or parāmarśa. Such hetus have the semblance of hetus; in reality they do not contribute to the rise of anumiti. Again you may note that no hetu is a sadhetu or asadhetu by itself. It is only in certain combinations with certain pakṣa and sādhya that a hetu loses its power of generating anumiti. Five varieties of such hetus with their sub-divisions have been explained in the foregoing pages. In fact, the Naiyāyikas have developed the concept of such hetus mainly to engage themselves in argumentative exercises with other schools of Indian philosophy. Hence wherever the Naiyāyikas find any inconsistency in other systems, they immediately point out the defect by resorting to syllogistic arguments. As explained in the beginning of this unit, one should repeatedly go through this portion to understand the hair-split differences between one hetvābhāsā and the other. Following the discussion on hetvabhāsā, we have defined upamānapramāṇa. Again the latter is unique in the system of Nyāya in view of the fact that it serves as a means of comprehending the significative relation of a word to its sense. You have now known about the three means of valid knowledge, viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna and upamāna.

7.9 Self - Check Questions

(1) What is meant by hetvābhāsa ?

(2) How many types of hetvābhāsās are there ? Name them.

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(3). How is savyabhicāra defined ? What are its divisions.

(4) Define with illustration satpratipakṣa and viruddha.

(5) Explain and illustrate the first two varieties of asiddha.

(6) Explain Vyāpyatvāsiddhi.

(7) Explain the varieties of Upādhi.

(8) Explain the role played by each Hetvābhāsa.

(9) Why do the Naiyāyikas admit Upamāna as a distinct pramāṇa ?

(10) For Essay Question : Define and illustrate the varieties of hetvābhāsa.

7.10 Key - Words

(1) Hetvābhāsa (2) Savyabhicāra (3) Anupasamhārin (4) Satpratipakṣa (5) Viruddha (6) Āśrayāsiddha (7) Svarūpāsiddha (8) Sādhya Vyāpaka (9) Sādhana Avyāpaka (10) Upādhi (11) Upamāna (12) Sādṛśyajñāna (13) Śabdaśakti

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UNIT-8
Valid Verbal Testimony [Śabda Pramāṇa]

STRUCTURE

8.0 Objectives
8.1 TS - Śabda as a pramāṇa defined and analysed
8.2 TSD - Śakti (Primary Significative Power of a word) as God's will (Īśvarasaṇketa) and as the relation of word to its sense
8.3 Primary Meaning - Is it a Universal or a Particular? Mimāṁsaka and Naiyāyika theories contrasted.
8.4 Means of comprehending the primary significative power in a word
8.5 Only action - oriented words generate meaning Prābhākara view criticized
8.6 (a) Lakṣaṇā - Secondary significative power - analysed
(b) Three varieties of lakṣaṇā - Explained and illustrated
(c) Gauṇī-vṛtti - Analysed
(d) Vyañjanā vṛtti - The suggestive power of a word analysed as a kind of śakti or lakṣaṇā
(e) On the ground of resorting to lakṣaṇā
8.7 The problem of elliptical sentences - Mīmāṁsaka and Naiyāyika views
8.8 The concept of yoga-rūḍhi
8.9 Anvitābhidhānavāda versus abhihitānvayavāda
8.10 Let us sum up
8.11 Self-check questions
8.12 Key - words

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UNIT-8
Valid Verbal Testimony [Śabda Pramāṇa]

8.0 OBJECTIVES

Language, is a vehicle of communication, which takes place through sentences comprised of individual words. When a sentence is uttered and heard, or read and understood, the hearer or the reader arrives at the sentence -sense. Now, it is of utmost importance to know how one arrives at sentential sense. The latter is also referred to as verbal cognition (śabdabodha). It arises from sentence uttered by a trustworthy person. Such a sentence is called śabdapramāṇa. The sanskrit grammarians propounded theories about the nature of the sentence and disputed with the Naiyāyikas who held opposite views. For these reasons the study of sentence became the most important concept for linguists and grammarians as well as for philosophers and logicians. The present unit will provide you ample scope for understanding the constituents that contribute to the genesis of sentence sense. You will come to know the process through which you are able to understand any known language when it is uttered or read. Although it appears that when a sentence is uttered we immediately understand its meaning and quickly respond to it, yet we have to be aware of the definite process involved in such an understanding. While the common man has least concerns over such matters, it is the philosophers, logicians, grammarians and linguistics who have worked much upon such issues. Again the concept of a word,

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sentence etc., also differes among the philosophers logicians and others. The present unit focuses on the concept of word, meaning, sentence, its sense etc., according to the logicians.

8.1 Śabda as a Pramāṇa - Defined and analysed

TS - आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः। आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता। वाक्यं पदसमूहः। यथा गामानयेति। शक्तं पदम्। अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इति ईश्वरसङ्केतः शक्तिः।।

Valid verbal testimony (śabdapramāṇa) is a proposition set forth by a trustworthy person (āpta). One who always speaks only truth is a trustworthy person (āpta). A sentence or proposition is a group of words like 'Bring a cow' (gāmānaya)

A word is that which has significative power (śakti). The will of God of the form ' From this word, this concept or meaning is to be known ' is called śakti.

TSD - 8.2 Śakti (Primary significance power of a word) as God's will (Īśvarasaṅketa) and as the relation of word to its sense.

शब्दं लक्षयति - आप्तेति। पदलक्षणमाह - शक्तमिति। अर्थस्मृत्यनुकूलः पदपदार्थसंबन्धः शक्तिः। सा च पदार्थान्तरमिति मीमांसकाः। तन्निरासार्थमाह - अस्मादिति। डित्थादीनामिव घटादीनामपि सङ्केत एव शक्तिः। न तु पदार्थान्तरमित्यर्थः।

The author defines Śabda [as a pramāṇa] in [the words] 'Valid verbal testimony is a ..... He gives the definition of trustworthy person [āpta] in [the words]' One who always speaks ..... The author defines a sentence in [the words] A sentence or proposition is ..... He gives the definition of word in [the words] 'A word is that which has

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significative power'. Śakti is the relation between a word and its sense, which is conducive in giving rise to the recollection of that sense. According to the Mimāṁsakas it is a distinct category. In order to repudiate this (view), the author says ' From this word this concept ..... '. That is to say, as of terms like ' dittha ' etc, so also of the terms ' pot ' etc. ' śakti ' consists in the desire or will (saṅketa) and it is not any separate category [in addition to the seven categories accepted by the Nyāya school].

Notes : In TS, Annaṁbhaṭṭa describes śakti or ' power ' as consisting in God's will [Īśvarasaṅketa or Īśvarecchā] that such and such a word is to signify such and such a thing. But in TSD the author describes this ' power ' as consisting in the relation between a word and the thing it signifies, which helps in recalling the thing signified. Thus it may be noted that these two explanations are different. God's will is one thing and the relation between a word and the sense it signifes (padapadārthasaṁbandha) is something else. Although Annaṁbhaṭṭa has not given any clarification of this point, yet, Nīlakaṇṭha, in his Prakāśika a commentary on the Dīpikā, provides an explanation. It is as follows : according to the Nyāya school śakti is not a distinct category apart from the seven categories. But the Mimāṃsakas admit it to be so. According to them the 'power' to signify something is inherent in a word. A word according to this school, is a kind of sound and is a substance and its power to signify is something intrinsic (sahaja) to it in the sense that it is not instilled into it ab extra. The Mimāṁsā school also postulates another kind of power called causal-power (kāraṇaśakti) and it is different from ' signifying power '.

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All this is opposed to the Naiyāyikas. The 'signifying power' of a word is according to them nothing but the 'signifying relation' (padapadārtha sambandha) obtaining between a word and what it signifies. It is not anything intrinsic to the word. It is something wholly external to the being of a word and is due to some convention. This convention is nothing but a desire on the part of a conscious being that such and such a word shall stand for such and such a thing. And this conscious being on whose desire or will, the meaning - relation is based is, generally speaking, a super human being or God. Now, why should the Naiyāyikas describe ' śakti ' or the signifying power of a word as consisting in God's will. The Naiyāyikas say that it is due to the acceptance of the general vaidika belief that language or speech has a divine origin. If speech is said to have a divine origin, then it can be understood only as the revelation by the will of the supreme being that such and such a word - signifies such and such a thing.

8.3 Primary Meaning - Is it a Universal or a Particular ? Mimāṁsaka and Naiyāyika theories contrasted

TSD - गवादिशब्दानां जातावेव शक्तिः विशेषणतया जाते प्रथममुपस्थितत्वात् व्यक्तिलाभस्त्वाक्षेपादिना इति केचित्। तन्न गामानयेत्यादौ वृद्धव्यवहारात्सर्वत्रानयनादेर्व्यक्तावेव संभवेन जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तावेव शक्तिकल्पनात्।

Terms like ' cow ' etc., have their signifying power with reference only to a universal, it is the univesal that is first presented to the mind as the adjectival feature [viśeṣaṇa] (in a cognition) and the awareness of a particular thing arises by implication (ākṣepa) - this is the view of some [Mimāṁsakas]. This view, however, is not acceptable.

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In the case of [a statement] 'Bring the cow' or others like it, employed by an experienced person, since 'bringing' etc, is intelligible only of a particular object, the signifying power [of a word] is held [by the Naiyāyika] to exist only in reference to a ' particular (individual) as characterised by a Universal.

Notes : An important question that lies at the basis of several theories of śābdabodha proposed by different schools is whether a word like ' ghaṭa ' primarily denote the object jar (vyakti) or the common property - universal - jarness that exists in the vyakti or both together ? These are variously referred to as केवल व्यक्ति शक्तिवाद, केवल जातिशक्तिवाद, जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तिशक्तिवाद. The first is adopted by the modern Naiyāyikas, the second by the Mimāṁsakas and the third by ancient Naiyāyikas. The advocates of each of these views look at the significant word from different stand points. When one says ' ghaṭam ānaya ', the speaker no doubt desires the object, pot and not the universal - jarness to be brought to him. That the ' vyakti ' jar must be somehow or other implied by the word "ghaṭa" is therefore necessary, for unless it is so implied the hearer can never fetch the object. Modern Naiyāyikas rely on this simple fact and say that the word 'ghaṭa' primarily denotes the individual pot (ghaṭavyakti). The capacity of being the subject of any act (arthakriyākāritva) exists in the vyakti alone, and hence it is the vyakti where the śakti resides. But according to the Mimāṁsakas (जातिवादि) words are purely abstract names denoting the jāti only. If a word signifies only jāti, then the sentence would mean 'ghaṭatvam ānaya' which is absurd because ghaṭatva cannot be separated from the concrete objects. The Mimāṁsakas,

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however maintain that the fact that ghaṭatva cannot be separated from the concrete object is exactly the reason why the significance of the word ghaṭa should be confined to the jāti, while the notion of vyakti must be conveyed by ākṣepa or necessary implication.

The ancient Naiyāyikas seem to have adopted a middle course between these extremes by holding that words denote neither केवलव्यक्ति nor केवलजाति but जातिविशिष्टव्यक्ति, i.e., a particular object ghaṭa as possessing the universal - ghaṭatva.

Thus it may be seen that in the केवलव्यक्तिशक्ति वाद words are purely denotative ; while in केवलजातिशक्तिवाद words are purely connotative. Similarly in the जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तिशक्तिवाद of the ancient Naiyāyikas they are both denotative and connotative.

8.4 Means of comprehending the primary significative power in a word

शक्तिग्रहश्च वृद्धव्यवहारेण। व्युत्पित्सुर्बालो गामानयेत्युत्तमवृद्धवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं मध्यमवृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य गवानयनं च दृष्ट्वा मध्यमवृद्धप्रवृत्तिजनकज्ञानस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वाक्यजन्यत्वं निश्चित्याश्वमानय गां बधान इति वाक्यान्तर आवापोद्वापाभ्यां गोपदस्य गोत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिः अश्वशब्दस्याश्वत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरिति व्युत्पद्यते।

The knowledge of śakti or the direct signifying power [of a term] arises for a person from [the observation of] the practice of experienced or elderly persons. To be explicit : A child who is curious to know [the meaning] after hearing an elderly speaker utter the words ' Bring a cow ' and observing the ' bringing of cow ' by an elderly hearer (madhyamavṛddha), infers [the presence of] a volition

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(pravṛtti) in the latter ; he is then assured by ' agreement in presence ' (anvaya) and agreement in absence (vyatireka) that the knowledge inducing the volition in the elderly hearer is due to the utterance [of the elderly speaker] ; and on hearing another utterance ' Bring the horse and tie the cow ', the child comes to understand through insertion (āvāpa) and elimination (udvāpa) that the signifying power (śakti) of the term ' cow ' refers to individuals with [the class - character] ' cowness ' and that the significative power of the term ' horse ' refers to individuals with the [class - character] ' horseness '.

Notes : Although there are many different ways of learning the significative relation of a word to its sense the author here refers to only one of them. Other such means are grammar (vyākaraṇa) analogy (upamāna) lexicon (kośa) statements uttered by trustworthy persons (āptavākya) complement of the text (vākyaśeṣa) explanation (vivaraṇa) due to proximity of a known word (siddhapadasānnidhya) Annaṁbhaṭṭa has chosen only vṛddhavyavahāra as an important way, as the others are meant for sophisticated people and not suitable for children who are just about to learn the meaning of words. Here the observation of the linguistic practice of elders seems to be one of the most important sources in the first stages of learning. A child observes one of his elders use the expression ' Bring a cow ' in the presence of another elderly person and observes that the latter in response brings a cow. He remembers that there was no physical activity of bringing as long as there was no utterance of the kind mentioned and notices that the activity follows the utterance. This kind of agreement in presence and agreement in absence (anvaya-vyatireka)

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leads the child to conclude that the physical activity of the elderly hearer has some relation with the words uttered by the elderly speaker. This can be explained as follows : the physical activity of the hearer is due to his volitional activity and the latter is due to his understanding of the words of the speaker. The child thus is assured that the hearer's activity is due ultimately to a cognitive state initiated in the latter's mind by the words uttered by the speaker. Again the same child observes an elderly person use the expression ' Bring a horse and bind the cow ' and notices that it is followed by the hearer's physical activity of ' bringing a horse and binding the cow '. Thus by a process of eliminative thinking the child understands that the activities of ' bringing ' and ' binding ' have for their object, the term cow and the child thus realises that the term 'cow' signifies the specific animal which is the centre of the activities of 'bringing' and 'binding'.

8.5 Only Action - Oriented Words Generate Meaning - Prābhākara View Criticised

TSD - ननु सर्वत्र कार्यपरत्वात् व्यवहारस्य कार्यवाक्य एव व्युत्पत्तिर्न सिद्धपर इति चेन्न। काश्यां त्रिभुवनतिलको भूपतिरित्यादौ सिद्धेऽपि व्यवहारात् विकसितपद्मे मधुकर इत्यादौ प्रसिद्धपदसमभिव्याहान् सिद्धेऽपि मधुकरादिपदे व्युत्पत्तिदर्शनाच्च।।

It might be contended that since lingusitic practice of elderly persons everywhere has reference to some action the 'signifying power' of a term is apprehended as having reference only to something directly connected with some action and not to anything which is accomplished (siddha) (i.e., unconnected with action). It is replied that this objection cannot be accepted in view of the fact that there

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is linguistic practice having reference also to an accomplished entity as in [the statement]'. There is a prince in Kāśi who is the ornament of the three worlds '; and also in usages like ' the bee (madhukara) in sipping nectar from a full - blown lotus , because of the association with well-known terms [like nectar, full - blown lotus '] the comprehension of the signifying power of a term like ' bee ' is found to have reference also to an accomplised (siddha) object.

8.6 (a) Lakṣaṇā - Secondary Significative Power - Analysed

TSD - लक्षणापि शब्दवृत्तिः। शक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा। गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र गङ्गापदवाच्यप्रवाहसंबन्धादेव तीरोपस्थितौ तीरेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्प्यते। सैन्धवादौ लवणाश्वयोः परस्परसंबन्धाभावान्नानाशक्ति कल्पनम्।

Lakṣaṇā or the secondary significative power also exists in a word. Lakṣaṇā is the relation [of a word] to what is primarily conveyed (śakya) by it. In [a statement like] "The hamlet is in the Ganges" there is the presentation [to the mind] of the river - bank (tira) owing to its relation to the current of the river which is signified by the term gaṇgā. Hence there is no primary significative power in the sense that is secondarily known. However, in the case of [a term like] ' saindhavā ', since there is the absence of [any direct] mutual relation between ' salt ' and ' horse ', there is the postulation of a multiple ' direct signifying power '.

(b) Three varieties of Lakṣaṇā - Explained and Illustrated

लक्षणा त्रिविधा। जहल्लक्षणाजहल्लक्षणा जहदजहल्लक्षणा चेति।

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यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयाभावस्तत्र जहती यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीति। यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयस्तत्राजहती यथा छत्रिणो गच्छन्तीति। यत्र वाच्यैकदेशत्यागेनैकदेशान्वयस्तत्र जहदजहती यथा तत्त्वमसीति।

Lakṣaṇā is of three kinds : (i) jahal-lakṣaṇā (ii) ajahal-lakṣaṇā and (iii) jahad-a-jahallakṣaṇā. (i) Where the primary meaning does not have syntactical relation (with the other meanings of words in a sentence) then it is an instance of jahallakṣaṇā as for example 'The cradles are crying'. (ii) Where the primary meaning also finds place in the syntactical relation among words in a sentence, it is called a-jahal-lakṣaṇā. For example 'The umbrellas are going. (iii) Where a part of the primary meaning is abandoned and another part is related to the other meanings it is known as jahadajahallakṣaṇā as in the case of tattvamasi etc.,

Notes : (i) Jahal-lakṣaṇā or Exclusive Secondary Signification is had where a word leaves out its primary meaning totally and conveys another meaning related to it, secondarily. This has been exemplified by the sentence 'The cradles are shouting (or) crying'. Here the act of crying is incompatible with the cradles. And there cannot be any syntactical relation (anvaya) between these two words in the sentence. Hence the word cradle (mañcāḥ) totally leaves out its primary senses and conveys another sense, viz., the babies in the cradle secondarily. This meaning is one which is related to the primary meaning.

(ii) The second type of lakṣaṇā is resorted to where a word conveys a sense secondarily without leaving its primary meaning. For example, in the sentence 'The umbrellas are going', the term umbrella apart from conveying its primary sense of the umbrellas conveys

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another sense secondarily, viz., the persons holding the umbrella. This kind of non-exclusive secondary signification is resorted to, as otherwise there would be no syntactical relation (anvaya) between the meanings of the words 'umbrella' and 'going'.

The third type of lakṣaṇā is named jahad-a-jahallakṣaṇā or exclusive-cum-non-exclusive secondary signification. As an example of such a type, the author cites the Upaniṣadic dictum 'Tat tvam asi' and interprets it in the manner of an Advaita thinker. The dictum asserts the identity of the finite self with the infinite supreme self. But this identity would not be intelligible if the terms 'tat' and 'tvam' occuring in the dictum were to be taken in their literal sense. It is because there can be no identity of their literal meanings as they convey respectively mutually opposed meanings. Hence the words tat and tvam leave out a part of their primary meanings, viz., infinitude and finitude and convey another part viz., the sense of consciousness, secondarily. Since the underlying consciousness is same in the meanings of both the words tat and tvam the sentence as a whole conveys the sense of identity of the inner self with the supreme self.

C - Gauṇī-Vṛtti - Analysed

गौण्यपि लक्षणैव लक्ष्यमाणगुणसंबन्धरूपा। अग्निर्माणवक इति।

The secondary sense (gauṇīvṛtti) (of a term) is also nothing but (its) 'indirect sense' and is of the nature of (its) relation to the property apprehended (lakṣyamāṇa = gṛhyamaṇa) (in the 'direct significate' of the term in question) eg., The student is fire.

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Notes : After analysing the three types of lakṣaṇā Annaṁbhaṭṭa takes up gauṇivṛtti or the figurative sense of a term. This is exemplified by what is signified by the term fire in a statement like 'The student is fire' or by the term 'lion' in a statement like 'The young fellow is a lion'. In their direct sense the terms signify respectively a burning substance or a kind of 'wild beast'. But since a student cannot literally be a burning substance, nor can he be a wild beast (lion), it is to be understood that the terms have been used in an indirect sense and not in their direct literal sense. But is this a variety of lakṣaṇā ? According to the Mīmāṁsakas this figurative sense of the terms is indirect no doubt but it is not the same thing as lakṣaṇā. It is a new kind of signifying power of the terms and is other than either śakti or lakṣaṇā. Annaṁbhaṭṭa, however, does not accept this position and emphasises that this gauṇīvṛtti or figurative sense; is the same thing as lakṣaṇā or the indirect senses; for it is a kind of relation to 'the properties apprehended in the direct significates of the terms under reference (lakṣyamāṇaguṇasaṁbandhasvarūpa). In the case of the sentences 'The student is fire', the term fire by its indirect signifying power conveys the properties of 'purity' and 'brightness' which are present in the burning substance itself that constitutes the direct significate of the term 'fire'. The latter, of course has no immediate specific relation to the scholar. But since the student has also the properties of purity and brightness, the fire may be said to be in some mediate relation to the student through these properties. This mediate relation is what constitutes the nature of the indirect signifying power of the term 'fire'. Exactly similar consideration applies to the sentence 'The student is lion'.

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d. Vyañjanāvṛtti - The Suggestive Power of a Word - Analysed as a kind of Śakti or Lakṣaṇā

व्यञ्जनापि शक्तिलक्षणान्तर्भूता। अर्थशक्तिमूला चानुमानादिनान्यथासिद्धा।।

The suggestive power (vyañjanā) again is included either under direct signifying power or under 'indirect signifying power' and it has its basis in the signifying power of a term; but that which has its basis in the signifying power of what is signified is intelligible otherwise (anyathāsiddha) as due to inferential means etc.,

Notes : According to the advocates of the theory of vyañjanā as a distinctive power of terms it is of two kinds: one based on the power of a term (śabdaśaktimūlā) and the other based on the power of what is signified by a term (arthaśaktimūlā). An example of this kind of vyañjanā an unknown poet states : 'Go if you want to, my beloved. May your journey be blessed. And may I, be born again only at the place where you have gone'. These words are supposed to have been uttered by a devoted wife to her husband on the eve of the latter's departure for a distant place. The first two sentences are direct anxious expressions of the feelings of a devoted wife on the eve of her separation from the husband. But taken along with the third sentence they take on a new complexion and suggest something quite the opposite of what they signify in their direct sense. According to the rhetoricians this suggested sense is not to be obtained either through the direct or through the indirect signifying power of any of the words actually spoken. It must have then been obtained through a different kind of signifying power of what is meant by the

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statement in question. The suggested sense here is 'arthaśaktimūlā'. Annambhaṭṭa repudiates, however, this arthaśakti-mūla vyañjanā quite as decisively as he has repudiated the other variety of vyañjanā, viz., śabdaśaktimūla. He is of the view that this second kind of alleged suggestive power is 'intelligible otherwise as due to inferential means etc.,' (anumānādinā anyathāsiddha). What he means to say is that since this kind of 'suggestive power' is intelligible in terms of reflection involving inference etc., the postulation here of a distinctive 'suggestive power' is also uncalled for. But he does not explain how this cognition through the so called 'arthaśaktimūlāvyañjana' is intelligible as a kind of inference and he does not either explain what he intends to convey by etc., (ati) in this part of this Tarkasaṅgrahadīpikā.

(2) On the Ground of Resorting to Lakṣaṇā

तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजम्। तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वं तात्पर्यम्। तात्पर्यज्ञानं च वाक्यार्थज्ञाने हेतुः। नानार्थानुरोधात्तु प्रकरणादिकं तात्पर्यग्राहकम्।

The occasion for (admitting) lakṣaṇā or the 'indirect sense' (of a term) is supplied by the unintelligibility that arises in the absence of any syntactical relation of the intention (tātparya) of the speaker. Tātparya or purpose of the speaker consists in his utterance of a word to convey a sense according to his desire. This intended sense is the cause of sentential sense. Context (prakaraṇa) etc., become the revealing factor of purpose (tātparya), in the case of words having more than one meaning.

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Notes : The present text concerns the occasion for admitting ' lakṣaṇā ' or the indirect sense of the term. According to one view, it is the difficulty in syntax (anvayānupapatti) that furnishes the required occassion. For example in the case of the sentence gaṅgāyam goṣaḥ - A group of houses on the Ganges, there is no syntactical relation of the group of houses and the current of the river ' Ganges '. Hence the word ' Gaṅga ' secondarily conveys the sense of the banks of river. But in instances such as 'send the sticks inside' (yaṣṭiḥpraveśaya) there is no unintelligibility of the syntactical relation ; yet there is unintelligibility of the meaning intended by the speaker. In other words, there is tātparyānupapatti. That is, the intention of the speaker is to send the elderly persons with stick in their hands inside. With this in view he utters the statement yaṣṭiḥ praveśaya. Thus in the present case tātparya anupapatti and not anvaya anupapatti is the ground for resorting to lakṣaṇā. But as explained earner we have anvaya anupapatti in the case of gaṅgāyam ghoṣaṇ. We cannot however, maintain two different grounds for restoring to lakṣaṇā. Hence to maintain uniformity we may explain that in the case of gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ, the intention (tātparya) of the speaker to convey the 'banks of the river ganges' will not be otherwise intelligible, if we do not resort to lakṣaṇā. Thus in all cases tātparyānupapatti ... ' explained as the ground for taking recourse to lakṣaṇā. In the case of words, which have more than one meaning such as ' Saindhava ' which means both salt and horse one has to fix its meaning on the basis of the context in which it is occured. If if is uttered in the context of dinner it means salt and in the context of a war it would mean horse.

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8.7 The problem of Elliptical sentences - Mīmāṁsaka and Naiyāyika Views

TSD - द्वारमित्यादौ पिधेहीति शब्दाध्याहारः। ननु अर्थज्ञानार्थत्वात् शब्दस्यार्थमविज्ञाय शब्दाध्याहारासंभवात् अर्थाध्याहार एव युक्त इति चेन्न। पदविशेषजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितेः शाब्दज्ञानहेतुत्वात्। अन्यथा घटः कर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिः इत्यत्रापि शाब्दज्ञानप्रसङ्गात्।

As the awareness of purport (tātparya) determines the awareness of what is signified by a sentence, in the case of a statement like ' the door ' (dvāram) [used as the accusative singular] there is the supplying (adhyāhāra) of the word ' close ' (pidhehi) [used as a verb imperative]. If it be objected that since the knowledge of a word is for effecting a knowledge of what is meant [by the word] it is not possible to have ' supplying of words ' in the absence of a knowledge of what is meant. Hence it is proper to admit only the ' supplying of the significate ' [prior to that of the significant word]. It is replied that since the cause of verbal cognition happens to be the knowledge arising from that of significant words alone, it is but proper to hold the ' supplying of words ' and not the sense in such cases. If this is not admitted there would be ' the understanding of a sentence ' even when there is the [independent] presentation of [significates like] pot, being an accusative (ghataḥ karmatvam) act of bringing (ānayanam) and volitional effort (kṛtiḥ)

Notes : Annaṁbhaṭṭa now directs his attention to the discussion on the elliptical employment of language. In such an employment, certain words are found omitted from a statement and these have got to be supplied to complete construction or sense. The discussion centres around the question as to what exactly is to be supplied to complete

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the sense of elliptical statement. According to Annaṁbhaṭṭa and other adherents of the Nyāya school, consideration of purport is a uniform condition for the understanding of a statement. The Prābhākara school of the Mimāṁsā accepts this position and holds that the logical consequence is that what is needed to fill up the gaps in an elliptical statement is the ' supply of the sense of a word' (arthādhyāhāra) and not the ' supply of the word itself '(śabdādhyāhāra). This follows according to them, from the fact that the ' purport consciousness ' means the consciousness of what is intended to be conveyed by an utterance and that what is intended to be conveyed is the things meant by certain words and not the words themselves. Thus the Prābhākara is assured that in the case of elliptical language, what is first required to fill up the ellipsis is the supply of the needful significates and not of the terms corresponding to those significates. Annaṁbhaṭṭa, however, does not agree on this point. He agrees in so far as the supply of the significates of words but he emphasizes that it cannot be done directly, but only through a supply of significant words. He adds that the mere supply of the missing significates (arthādhyāhāra) cannot determine the understanding of a sentence. Annaṁbhaṭṭa clarifies his position by means of a Sanskrit sentence like 'ghaṭamānaya' meaning 'Bring a pot'. We do not have an understanding of such a sentence if we have the mere presentation to our minds of the several things meant by the terms constituting the sentence. In an inflectional language like Sanskrit, the constituents of the sentence are to be analysed as follows : ' ghaṭa ' ' am ' (the non - verbal suffix for accusative singular), ā + nī (the verbal root with a prefix) and hi (the verbal suffix for

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Imperative mood, second person singular). Four significates or senses correspond respectively to these four constituent terms, viz. a thing 'pot', 'being an accusative', 'the act of bringing' and 'exercise of volition'. Here the presentation of these four senses in succession independently certainly do not effect the state of mind describable as ' understanding the meaning of the statement 'ghaṭam ānaya', but it could be generated only if the senses were known from the significant terms. Otherwise there would be the understanding of a 'sentence' even when there is the [independent] presentation of the senses like ' a pot ' ' being an accusative ' act of bringing and ' volition '. In the elliptical statement ' dvāram ' the purport (which is realised from the context) demands that the ellipsis has got to be filled up by the supply of the word 'pidhehi'. The completed statement would then mean 'close the door'.

8.8 The concept of Yoga-Rūdhi

TSD - पङ्कजादिपदेषु योगरूढिः। अवयवशक्तिर्योगः। समुदायशक्ती रूढिः। नियतपद्मत्वज्ञानार्थं समुदायशक्तिः। अन्यथा कुमुदेऽपि प्रयोगप्रसङ्गः।

In terms like 'paṇkaja' etc., there is ' yogarūḍhi '. The signifying power of composite parts (avayavaśakti) is yoga; the signifying power of the whole (samudāyaśakti is rūḍhi. For the regular presentation of the specific features of lotus (padmatva) 'the signifying power of the whole' [has to be admitted]. Otherwise, there would be application [of the term paṇkaja] to kumuda as well.

Notes : According to the Nyāya school, significant terms (śaktapada) are classified under four heads, viz., yaugika, rūḍha, yoga-rūḍha and yaugikarūḍha (i) when a

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term signifies a sense through the senses of its composite parts (avayavaśakti) it is known as yaugika. eg. the term 'pācaka'. It is derived from the verb 'pac' with the primary suffix 'ṇaka' and these respectively convey the act of cooking and its agent. As a whole it conveys the sense of ' a cook '. Thus the word pācaka is treated to be yangika śabda as it conveys a sense through its composite parts. (ii) When a word conveys a meaning conventionally without depending on the meaning of its composite parts it is called as rūḍhi. For example, the word 'gauḥ' means a cow, conventionally for if it were treated as a yaugikaśabda, it may mean any thing that accomplishes the act of going through the meaning of its composite parts as 'gacchati iti' (that which goes) gauḥ. (iii) When a word signifies the same meaning through meanings of its composite parts as well as through convention then it is called yoga-rūḍhi. For example, the word "paṇkaja" conveys the sense of lotus conventionally and at the same time through the meanings of its composite parts also it signifies a lotus as "paṇkāt jāyata iti paṇkajaḥ" meaning that which arises from mud. (iv) When a term signifies one sense through the meanings of its composite parts and another sense through convention it is called 'yaugikarūḍha'. For example the word 'udbhit' conveys a plant, through the power of its composite parts as ūrdhvam bhinatti its - udbhit - that which comes up breaking open upwards. It conveys the sense of a sacrifice by name 'udbhit' conventionally. Thus one and the same word conveys two different senses through two different powers.

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8.9 Anvitābhidhānavāda versus Abhihitānvayavāda

TSD - इतरान्विते शक्तिरिति प्राभाकराः। अन्वयस्य वाक्यार्थतया भानसंभवादन्वयांशेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्पनीया इति गौतमीयाः।।

The signifying power of a term has reference always to something that is 'in relation to another thing' (itarānvita) - this is what the adherents of the school of Prābhākara hold. The followers of the school of Gautama (Nyāya school) hold the view that the relation among word - meanings also constitutes sentence - sense and hence we need not admit separate signifying power (śakti) in the relation among word - meanings too.

Notes : Annaṁbhaṭṭa here refers to the controversy between the followers of Prābhākara and those of Gautama as to whether the ' śakti ' of a term refers to a thing as related to another thing (itarānvita) or to a bare unrelated thing. The former doctrine is upheld in the school of Prabhākara, while the latter is the one advocated by the adherents of the Nyāya school of Gautama. How does the presentation of the relations become possible ? Is it due to the terms themselves that comprise a statement or to something else ? According to the followers of Prābhākara as there is nothing in the statement besides the component terms it must be the terms themselves which make for the presentation of the relations also and not merely of the things that are presented as related. In other words, the significative power of a term does not exhaust with the presentation of a bare unrelated thing; but it signifies a thing along with its relation to another thing. This theory is known as anvitābhidhānavāda. That is, here the words themselves have the inherent capacity to give rise to the knowledge of the relation of the senses of words viz., the sense of a sentence. Thus the senses of the words also come within

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the range of the primal relation itself. The adherents of the Nyāya school, however do not subscribe to the above view. They hold that the words through their inherent capacity give rise to the knowledge of their senses. The senses later give rise to the knowledge of their relation, viz., the sense of a sentence. Since words cease to function with giving rise to the knowledge of their senses, and since the sense of the sentence, that is, the relation of the senses of the words, must be based on words, this theory holds that words in their capacity as words give rise to the knowledge of their senses. This theory is known as abhihitānvayavāda. In the light of the above, the followers of the Nyāya school hold that the signifying power of terms need not be regarded as having any reference to the "anvaya" or the relation obtaining among what is signified by the terms of a sentence.

8.10 Let Us Sum Up

The fourth pramāṇa accepted in the Nyāya school is called Śabda. The knowledge resulting from this pramāṇa is called śābda-bodha or knowledge from testimony. Śabda is first defined as the statement of an authoritative person. An authoritative person is one who utters what conforms to facts. A statement is defined as a collection of significant words. Since a 'significant' word is a word that has the power to signify something, the question naturally arises as to the exact nature of this power. This power (śakti) is God's will that a particular word would signify particular sense. Then follows the discussion whether the significative power is present in the universal or the individual (vyakti). Then the secondary significative power (lakṣaṇā) with all its varieties and examples have been discussed. Problems

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relating to the suggestive power (vyaṅgya) and gauṇivṛtti have been analysed. The ground for resorting to lakṣaṇā and the different kinds of words such as rūḍhi, yogarūḍhi are dealt with illustrative examples.

8.11 SELF CHECK EXERCISES

1. How is Śabdapramāṇa defined ?
2. Define the following : (1) āpta (2) śakti (3) vākya saṇketa.
3. Is it a universal or a particular that is known as the primary meaning ?
4. Discuss the several means of comprehending the significative power in words ?
5. Define lakṣaṇā and its varieties ?
6. When do we take recourse to lakṣaṇa ?
7. Define Gauṇi-vṛtti with examples.
8. Is Vyañjanā or suggestive power different from śakti and lakṣaṇā - give reasons.
9. Discuss the problems related to elliptical sentences.
10. What are the kinds of words ? Elucidate the concept of yoga-rūḍhi.
11. State the difference between the Prābhākras and the Naiyāyikas in knowing the sentence meaning.

8.12 KEY WORDS

1. Śakti 2. Saṇketa 3. Śaktigraha upāya 4. Lakṣaṇā 5. Gauṇi-vṛtti 6. Vyañjanāvṛtti 7. Rūḍhi, yogarūḍhi 8. Śabdādhyāhāra 9. Arthādhyāhara 10. Abhihitānvaya vāda and Anvitābhidhānavāda.

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Model Questions from Unit V - VIII

1. कारणस्य लक्षणकथनपूर्वकं तस्य त्रैविध्यम् सोदाहरणं वर्णयत।
2. प्रमायाः लक्षणं किम्? सोदाहरणं विवृणुत।
3. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् - सन्निकर्षस्य प्रभेदान् प्रपञ्चयत।
4. प्रत्यक्षस्य द्वैविध्यम् सोदाहरणं वर्णयत।
5. अनुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वं निराकुरुत।
6. अन्यथासिद्धिर्नाम का? तस्याः प्रभेदान् सोदाहरणं प्रपञ्चयत।
7. अनुमितिलक्षणम् किम्?
8. अनुमितिपरामर्शयोः कार्यकारणभावं निश्चीयत।
9. व्याप्तिर्नाम का? विवृणुत।
10. अनुमानद्वैविध्यम् वर्णयत।
11. लिङ्गं त्रिविधम् - सोदाहरणं वर्णयत।

ಆದೇಶ ಸಂಖ್ಯೆ : ಕರಾಮುವಿ/ಸಿಪಾವಿ/4-411/2005-06, ಚೈತ್ರ ಎಂಟರ್‌ಪ್ರೈಸಸ್, ಬೆಂಗಳೂರು
ಕಾಗದ : 60 ಜಿ.ಎಸ್.ಎಂ. - ಎಂ.ಪಿ.ಎಂ. ಮುಖಪುಟ 170 ಜಿ.ಎಸ್.ಎಂ. ಆರ್ಟ್
ಪರಿಮಾಣ : 500 ಪ್ರತಿಗಳು (ಸಂಖ್ಯೆ 1ರಿಂದ 500)

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

(ನಮೂದಿಸಿರುವ ಅಂಕಿ - ಜಿಲ್ಲೆಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಒಟ್ಟು ಅಧ್ಯಯನ ಕೇಂದ್ರಗಳ ಸಂಖ್ಯೆಯನ್ನು ಸೂಚಿಸುತ್ತದೆ.)

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